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I. To the Context: Introduction Towards an Object-Oriented Literary Criticism 
“But as it is, we notice that before our eyes 
Many things are moving various ways throughout the skies 
Above our heads, and on dry land, and in the briny ocean.”  
— Lucretius, The Nature of Things 
This project seeks to make a detailed analysis of the activity and vitality of the 
material culture present within contemporary American narratives. Drawing upon new 
ideas of Being developed by Object-Oriented philosophers, this work aims to divert 
literary analysis’s focus from the non-material, Jamesonian mode of the ‘Political 
Unconscious’ to a re-energized grappling with the ‘Material Unconscious’ that pervades 
contemporary texts. It is, in other terms, an effort to go to the object, with all that that 
entails.  
 On the face of it, the call to the objects may seem facile or innocuous— a relic of 
an old Joseph Addison tale or an ethnographer’s toolkit— but it carries within it a 
powerful idea. If we heed the command, if we make our focus object-oriented, we 
discover a weirder and more complex world than we might otherwise expect. The things 
around us, so often seen as meaningless signifiers or abased vessels, can be recognized as 
vital things, concealing within themselves an activity that we cannot appreciate. The 
hierarchies of action and behavior, the hierarchies of being, that our current ontological 
vision has constructed can be re-calibrated and flattened. To go to the objects, then, is to 
attempt to recover a vital space that has been long unimagined. 
Taking the ‘objects’ of contemporary society as the goal of inquiry is a 
contentious and difficult subject. To go to the objects, though, necessitates engagement 
with ongoing philosophical perspectives on ontology. Much of historical and 
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contemporary ontological thought has operated to undermine their legitimacy (and at 
times even their existence). Even as one tries to understand an object on its terms, critics 
from these positions are making every effort to destabilize it—deliberately or not, to 
undercut its material presence. Some are wont to claim that the object is simply a 
manifestation of some deeper underlying force (Harman, Quadruple Object 10-13). 
Others, swayed by the sign, attempt to undermine the object, subsuming both it and our 
reality in the mind or the post-structuralist frameworks of discourse or power (8-9). 
Neither ontological position is of much use in an effort to grasp the vitality or activity of 
the material object.  
 Worse than that, though, these pre-existing ontological interpretations actually 
threaten one’s ability to consider and to access the Being of the material thing. Caught 
between these eddies of undermining and overmining, the objects after which the critic 
seeks to chase can seem Protean forms, retreating not only within themselves but also 
within the vision of the world. The critic can reach out to grasp them only to see them 
evaporate into language. She can wrestle the words to the ground only to find it, and 
herself as well, transformed into some new Heraclitean fire. The critic can retreat into 
high-flung prose and complex analogies, losing the object under the weight of 
obscurantism. Then, the critic cannot go over the objects and cannot go under them. To 
go around the objects would be folly. Rather, this project argues that a critic may go to 
them, and treat them, bridge included, as they are.  
 If those ontological positions are flawed, the critic interested in grappling with 
questions of the object must instead embrace a developing branch of Speculative Realist 
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philosophy called, fittingly enough, Object-Oriented ontology. This movement, led by 
American philosophers Graham Harman and Levi Bryant as well as theorists like Jane 
Bennett and Timothy Morton, conceives of a flat ontology, one in which the role of the 
object as independent actant is highlighted and developed. Rather than undermining the 
object’s existence, Harman and Bryant argue that each individual object must be 
recognized as always already withdrawn within itself.  Conceiving of each object in this 1
manner significantly alters one’s vision of subject-object’ and ‘object-object’ 
relationships, making both networks spaces of vicarious mistranslation, but also revises 
the perceived epistemological break between the being of humans and the being of things 
(Morton, ‘Here Comes Everything’ 4). From an Object-Oriented perspective, the two 
categories are in fact one democracy of objects, full of vibrant and vital matter.  
 The philosophical basics of Harman’s Object-Oriented philosophical position are 
made clear in his 2011 work The Quadruple Object, wherein he invites scholars to reject 
their traditional visions of ontological epistemology.  Harman’s ontological vision is 2
founded upon a re-appraisal of Heidegger’s famed analogy of the hammer. In Section 1.3 
of Being and Time, Heidegger develops an ontological vision of the world based on the 
concept of the Dasein. Heidegger’s conception of the Dasein is a reworking of the 
traditional Husserlian vision of transcendental consciousness and object intentionality. To 
 Bryant’s argument for the withdrawal of the immanent object— that is to say the existence within each 1
individual object of an unknowable and unreachable surplus of being— is rather complex (befitting his 
training as a Lacanian psychoanalyst). In its most basic form, it differentiates “the ontologies of presence 
and transcendence and withdrawal and immanence” to reveal that the transcendent is always self-present 
while the very immanence of the vast world of objects reflects a withdrawal of each from the other (Bryant, 
The Democracy of Objects, 269). 
Harman’s perspective is privileged within this work as his 2004 book Tool-Being: Heidegger and the 2
Metaphysics of Objects stands as the primary progenitor of the movement. 
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Husserl, it is the thinking ego which both creates the subject’s consciousness of objects 
and makes all objective inquiry possible. For Heidegger, the Dasein, contra 
transcendental consciousness, is a kind of mode of being, whereby one is inherently and 
pre-consciously social and in-the-world. The Dasein operates with a necessary openness 
to the world and a kind of pre-intentional conception of being that is radically distinct 
from the transcendental consciousness imagined in Husserlian thought. 
  In explicating the Dasein’s interactions and encounters in the world, Heidegger 
develops an analogy to the common usage of equipment, specifically of a hammer. He 
argues that humans encounter the hammer in two main and incommensurable manners: as 
it is in use, when it is “ready-to-hand” (zuhanden), and when it is considered from afar, as 
an object of study, as “present-at-hand” (vorhanden). As Heidegger puts it, “the 
hammering itself uncovers the specific “manipulability” of the hammer...No matter how 
sharply we just look at the ‘outward appearance’ of things in whatever form this takes, we 
cannot discover anything ready-to-hand” (Heidegger 98). Moreover, in Heidegger’s view, 
there is one state of thing-being which allows the difference between these two categories 
to be crystallized, that of “unreadiness-to-hand.” Per Heidegger, the unusability of the 
tool that breaks, the hammer that can no longer nail, is discovered “not by looking at it 
and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which 
we use it” (102). This “unreadiness-to-hand” makes the object “conspicuous,” which has 
“the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of “presence-at-hand” in what is 
“ready-to-hand” (104). In other words, when the hammer breaks, its existence as 
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hammer, previously integrated into the working whole of the equipment at hand, jumps 
out at the user precisely because of its obstinate failure to work. 
 This is one of the most discussed philosophical analogies of the 20th century, but 
Harman has a unique and incisive reading of the passage. As he first explicated in his 
2003 text Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, Heidegger’s vision of 
“presence-at-hand” and “readiness-to-hand” reveals that objects withdraw from analysis, 
leaving part of themselves in a kind of “subterranean,” unreachable, reality (Harman, 
Tool-Being 1-2). Just as the “presence-at-hand" of the tool (which is kept hidden until its 
degradation) remains secreted within the object while it is “ready-to-hand,” the real 
qualities of each object remain withdrawn within themselves. One can look at a giraffe at 
the zoo or the seatback in front of them, but one cannot grasp the whole of their being, 
the entirety of their reality. Rather, one is trapped in what the philosopher of mind 
Thomas Nagel would term “the subjective character of experience—” the manner in 
which individual consciousness withdraws from and exceeds its physical components 
(Nagel 436).  
 This manner of withdrawal constitutes a kind of ‘hidden surplus,’ the cache of real 
qualities that are untranslatable, within each object. Amongst the Object-Oriented 
thinkers, Timothy Morton likely develops this conception of the ‘hidden surplus’ in the 
manner most pertinent to literary criticism. In The Ecological Thought, he develops a 
conception of all objects being what he terms “strange strangers”— things which are 
alien both existentially and phenomenologically— while nevertheless remaining totally 
entangled with each other in the “Mesh” (Morton 46-47). These dual facets of existence 
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render the world a weird space, one in which all things and places are uncannily 
connected— and indeed Morton draws upon Freud’s “the Uncanny” in his formulation of 
the ecological thought— and yet also haunted by ungraspable surpluses of being (52). 
Morton’s vision of the object, then, plays with the “irreducible” sign of the Barthesian 
reality effect, inverting its evacuation of meaning from the material thing to create an 
open, ghostly presence within it. If this seems a strange way of characterizing the world, 
that is how Morton wants it. To him, and to his theoretical companions, ours is a strange 
world, one full not only of “uncertainty” and “ambiguity,” but also vibrant activity 
(59-60). 
 Crucially, the existence of this ‘hidden surplus’ extends past the causal relations of 
human beings and objects. The withdrawn-ness hold true for all entities and all 
interactions, from humans and hammers to snowflakes and streetlights (Harman, Tool-
Being 2). As I stare at or rustle within the seatback pocket in front of me, the pocket itself 
withdraws from my interaction. At the same time, though, its interaction with the seat 
itself must be similarly shadowed by a surplus value.  
  From this vantage-point, every interaction of objects occurs as a kind of 
transformation, whereby the sensual qualities of the actors transmute each other. My 
rustling through the seatback pocket anthropomorphizes it. My interaction with the 
pocket is purely upon terms of human phenomenon: skin-based feelings of the texture of 
the fabric and the gloss of the in-flight magazine. The same must hold true, though, for 
the pocket’s sense of my hand; it must, in a way, pocket-omorphize my skin. Its 
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interaction with my hand, its stretching reaction to my spatial invasion, must develop 
from distinctly pocket phenomena.   3
This vision of objects necessarily decimates Heidegger’s own stubborn insistence 
on the central importance of Dasein. Or, to put it in a different manner, it expands the 
idea of Dasein to include all objects, rendering each thing unique and irreducible. In a 
ghostly world recognized as populated by ever-withdrawn objects, the centrality of the 
human being— of any one perspective— evaporates into a decentralized vision. The 
ontological vision recalls Bachelard’s rumination on the roundness of a tree; it “has 
countless forms, countless leaves” but it “is subject to no dispersion” (240-241). Gone is 
the totalitarian vision of the exceptional homo sapiens sapiens, replaced by the alliances 
of a flattened, democratized object world. The post-Kantian chasm between human and 
world that has for so long defined ontological argumentation must now be replaced by 
consideration of the gap between, as Harman puts it, “objects and relations” (Tool-Being 
2).  
An embrace of an object-oriented perspective places the nature and modality of 
the object in question. If each object is made up of atoms, or quarks, or vibrating strings, 
doesn’t the thing itself explode upon consideration? Isn’t it our own interaction with the 
object which defines it? These questions risk returning one’s perspective to a kind of 
dangerous correlationism, whereby the only way an object can exist is by means of 
relational interaction or observation (Morton, “Treating Objects” 60-61). An object is not 
 Indeed, the pocket must have a kind of alien phenomenology all its own. For more consideration of the 3
nature and implications of such phenomenologies from an Object-Oriented perspective, see the first chapter 
of Ian Bogost’s Alien Phenomenology, or, What It’s Like to Be a Thing (1-34).
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invalidated by the presence of smaller objects within it; as Timothy Morton says, “[t]hat a 
lifeform is made of atoms does not mean that the lifeform is less real than atoms” (59). 
Rather, the ghostly nature of withdrawn objects means that no object is reducible to any 
of its consistent parts. In fact, the object can exert a kind of “downward causality” on its 
constituent parts, influencing them in much the same way that they influence it (Bryant, 
The Democracy Of Objects 286-87). Larger objects can only be accounted for in terms of 
their own assemblage, not in terms of their smaller parts, so that each object then exists 
on its own terms.  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this Object-Oriented, flat perspective on the nature of 
things has met with some resistance. Many critics of the concept have characterized the 
idea of “withdrawn-ness” as mystical pablum or Sokelian, postmodern blather.  However, 4
and to no fault of Object-Oriented Ontology, modern research in the physical sciences 
serves to reject these criticisms and defend some of the movement’s most striking claims. 
Consider, for example, the quantum mechanical problem of entangled atoms.  Current 5
(peer-reviewed) research has finally allowed physicists to create the atomic relationship 
that physicists from Einstein to Podolsky to Schrödinger have theorized since the birth of 
quantum mechanics— singular atoms and particles have been isolated in various labs to 
 This critique is evident in Peter Wolfendale’s Object-Oriented Philosophy (the quote is drawn from pages 4
342-343), and is also present, if better articulated, in Christian Thorne’s blog-post “To the Political 
Ontologists.” The theorist Alexander Galloway holds a related position, arguing in “A response to Graham 
Harman’s ‘Marginalia on Radical Thinking’” that Object-Oriented Ontology’s use of postmodern language 
is not only blather (an Orwellian “koan”) but is in fact deliberately misleading from its inherently 
conservative roots. 
 This is a favorite example of Object-Oriented philosophers and their Speculative Realist ilk. For further 5
expansion on the ontological importance of quantum entanglement, see Karen Barad’s Meeting the 
Universe Halfway, especially p. 247-352 and Timothy Morton’s “Treating Objects Like Women.” Barad’s 
work is especially useful, as she delves into the mathematical and experimental underpinnings of the 
subject in-depth. 
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the point that their individual characteristics can no longer be independently described 
(Horodeck). It appears, instead, that the individual particle is instantly influenced by 
different, distant particle in spite of their disparate locations. Such behavior has been 
viewed in particles the size of photons to 30 micron long metal paddles (O’Connell). The 
only way for an observer to view the entangled particles is in the phenomenon of their 
interaction, so that the phenomenon becomes the ontological unit (Barad 347-49). The 
nature of these entangled particles—at once separate and inseparable, at once distinct and 
indistinct— is revelatory not only of the strange nature of quantum mechanics, but also of 
an unseen (and possibly unseeable) vitality within all things.  
The ability of things to interact in this manner (on the quantum level) renders 
even the most basic particles, most foundational sub-atomic pieces of the universe, 
actors. Although this is, as Ian Bogost would have us say, a kind of “alien” agency, one 
that seems far removed from typical acts like typing keys or shooting a basketball, it is an 
agency nonetheless (Bogost 1-8). Objects, then, act, although perhaps it is better to say 
they interact, and they do so constantly. The inability of the human observer to conceive 
of, to understand, the activity of objects— like the inability of the scientific observer to 
capture or differentiate the entangled particles of the quantum experiment— is due to the 
fact that they do not manifest the actions we expect them to. They do not act in the 
human-manner, or the Newtonian-manner, but in the alien-manner of a ghostly object.  
Moreover, quantum entanglement must force one to reconsider the position of the 
human observer in the ontological field. Just as the conception of the “withdrawn” object 
flattens the ontological field, removing the epistemological break that has theoretically 
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enabled our ability to claim an epistemological break between actors and objects, 
entanglement forces us to understand that we exist within and in concert with a whole 
plane of vital matter. As Karen Barad argues in breaking down her closely related theory 
of agential realism, entanglement allows us “not [to] position human concepts, human 
knowledge, or laboratory contrivances as foundational elements of the quantum theory,” 
but instead to see human beings as “emerg[ing] through specific intra-actions” between 
entangled actors and phenonema (Barad 352). In other words, the field of ontological 
observation is not only flat, but interwoven.  
 For the literary critic, the reconsideration of Being which an embrace of Harman’s 
Object-Oriented perspective requires can be of vital importance. Objects have always 
fascinated and haunted literature— from the rusty armor of Pericles, Prince of Tyre to the 
magic jade of The Story of the Stone— but the material culture present in literature has 
long presented something of a problematic for critics and theorists. Indeed, literary 
criticism has often been wary of investigating the multitudinous curios that people their 
stories. This perspective on the material culture within literature is well articulated by 
Barthes in his seminal essay “The Reality Effect.” The objects that fill up the small crags 
of literature, the barometer resting mid-sentence in Flaubert, are to Barthes “irreducible 
residues” defined by their “very absence of the signified” (142-148). Rather than acting 
as signs of their own materiality, the objects of literature merely serve to represent reality 
itself; they are evacuated of interior meaning. Although Barthes’s vision of ‘the reality 
effect’ can be incisive, its application to many texts can operate to obscure rather than 
elucidate the impact and meaning of the material culture there represented. Indeed, as Bill 
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Brown has demonstrated, even in Flaubert, even along Barthes’s semiotic term, the 
particular barometer resting on the particular table denote a variety of vital information 
about the society that created it and the activity of the ‘residual’ object itself (Brown, The 
Material Unconscious 16). 
 Moreover, even when the object if brought front-and-center, there often seems to 
be a natural reaction to pull away from the simple thing and to seek out the metonymic of 
the human subject in its treatment. Consider, for example, the case of Addison’s 
“Adventures of a Shilling.” In that 1714 essay, Addison depicts the piece of currency as 
actively narrating its day-to-day life, from its birth in Peru to its misadventures being 
traded around in England. It would seem, on its face, to be a prime opportunity for an 
object-oriented analysis, one in which the material thing cannot be semiotically discarded 
as a residue or emptied sign. Yet, critics have historically been quick to do just that, 
ignoring a consideration of the materiality of the story in favor of viewing the shilling’s 
narrative as a metonymic commentary on the English public in late Stuart England.  The 6
object, rather than being the subject in these analyses, becomes obscured and de-centered. 
Critics seem wont to pull material culture away from any suggestion of its own existence 
and towards an anthropocentric consideration of its humanity. 
 This problematic of material culture in literature first came to light in reaction to a 
larger academic movement that sought a reconsideration of the importance of the object 
in human interaction commonly called “Thing Theory.” Building on the work of 
influential anthropologists and cultural theorists, Thing Theorists have sought out what 
 See for example Amy Witherbee’s essay “The Temporality of the Public in The Tatler and The Spectator,” 6
in Volume 51 of The Eighteenth Century. 
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Bill Brown calls “the material unconscious” in literature, the “repository of disparate and 
fragmentary,…even contradictory images of the material everyday,” so as to detail both 
the influence objects have upon texts and the impact those texts have in “formalizing…
the heterogeneity of lived life” (The Material Unconscious 4).  The Thing Theorists thus 7
allow(ed) themselves to consider the material objects in their texts in the terms of their 
materiality. They made it so that objects, then, could be allowed to be considered as 
objects. Rather than, as Elaine Freedgood puts it, “indenturing” the material object to the 
human “subject,” Thing Theorists’ analysis allows the object to be treated in terms of its 
own properties and place in society, revealing new and understudied imaginaries within 
well-worn literary texts (Freedgood 12-13). Through their readings of literary objects, 
objects are allowed to retain (although it is often figured as an act of gaining) an 
individual significance within the work and the culture from which it developed.  
  Furthermore, the consideration of the circumstances and the labor folded within 
the ‘material unconscious’ of those texts has allowed Thing Theorists to develop a more 
energized politics of the object. Reading the literary object as object, which means of 
course considering its material history and societal significance, allows critics like 
Freedgood to consider the aesthetic differentiations between the metaphoric and the 
metonymic in the hermeneutics of Eliot’s Middlemarch (136-138). It also, though, creates 
the space for a re-consideration of the object’s place in the social life of the world, 
highlighting its formation and context as a commodity (Appadurai 13). A consideration of 
 The influence of anthropology on the literary pursuit of Thing Theory can perhaps not be overstated. The 7
impact is apparent even in Bill Brown’s liberal use of the term “Deep Play” in his reading of gambling in 
19th century American literature. 
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the material unconscious of literature, influenced as it is by the Jamesonian pursuit of the 
political unconscious, can serve to retrieve and clarify the colonial, class and gendered 
politics of literary texts in a manner otherwise impossible, drawing upon historical truths 
and metonymic readings to uncover new interstices and vectors of power relations in 
texts like Maggie or Jane Eyre (Brown, The Material Unconscious 205, Freedgood 
31-36).  
 At the same time, though, these analyses of the Thing retain many of the flaws 
that their manner of readings set out to remedy. Even while championing the object, 
while championing ‘the material unconscious,’ Thing theorists often appear unwilling or 
unable to accept the object on its own terms. Rather, they continuously return the human 
subject to the center of their analysis, rendering the object itself merely a commentary or 
symptom of humanity. Their analyses cannot escape from being anthropocentric in 
outlook and focus. Brown, when analyzing resorts and amusement rides as they appear in 
the fiction of Stephen Crane, cannot help but ceaselessly bring the material objects back 
to their human impact. Their importance, in his analysis, exists solely in their ability to 
quench people’s “eternal desire for more experience,” in their ability to act as a vessel of 
human emotion or signification (Brown, The Material Unconscious 51-52). The thing, 
which these analyses have set out to unearth and validate, thus disappears into the 
discussion of human activity.  
 Indeed, the possibility for the object to be an agent, to be more than a vessel of 
human signification, remains strangely absent from the vast majority of Thing Theory 
analyses. Although Thing theorists attempt to champion the importance of the material 
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commodity within literary texts, they can do so only in terms of undermining the activity 
of the object and reinforcing the divide between the subject and object. The object in 
Appadurai’s writings slinks into the ideologically potent but oddly still form of the 
commodity, where its significance lies more in what it denotes to the human observer 
than to its actual activity within the world (Appadurai 40). In Douglas Mao’s Solid 
Objects, perhaps the best current exegesis of the Thing in Modernist literature, the focus 
is on the subject’s ideological and physical “production of objects” (Mao 11). As he says 
of Virginia Woolf, Mao “seems more concerned with the process and difficulty of making 
than with the destiny of the made;” he is more concerned with tracing the character’s 
determinations and creations of objects than of the objects themselves (63). Moreover, 
Mao upholds a troubling distinction between the acting “subject” and the passive “object 
world” with which he/she interacts, defanging any kind of vitality or power that the 
Thing Theory approach may have had in championing the centrality of the object (20). 
Thus, through these anthropocentric analyses, then, the potential power of their object-
focused analysis is blunted, and the revolutionary aspect of their approach dissipates.  
 At times, it appears that Thing Theorists themselves are attempting to buck this 
mode of undermining the object. Freedgood’s reading of the Victorian object along 
metonymic lines, her embrace of metonymy’s “ability to disrupt meaning, to be endlessly 
vagrant and open-ended,” points to some effort to advance a flattened, non-
anthropocentric analysis (16). Her metonymic analytical tack provides the possibility of 
“mahogany” or “pewter” functioning as actors within the Victorian World, pushing 
against the anthropocentric staleness of allegorical reading (15-17). Unfortunately, even 
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while appearing to recognize this potentiality, Freedgood, like Mao and other Thing 
Theorists, appears incapable of making the leap to recognize the activity of the objects 
she hopes to discuss; almost as soon as she crafts the powerful vision of an open-ended, 
disruptive reading, she returns to a more pat, more hierarchical vision of the object as a 
“social hieroglyph,” a human vessel (28). Indeed, at no point does Freedgood appear to 
consider that her hieroglyphic things could be actors, could be vitally active, themselves. 
 This work, then, sets out to revitalize the analysis of the Thing Theorists by 
pushing their conceit past the anthropocentric boundaries theorists like Mao or Freedgood 
have placed around it. It takes Brown’s conception of the “material unconscious” 
seriously, perhaps even more seriously than he does, as it welds his vision of material 
culture to the Object-Oriented ontological framework of Harman and Morton. The union 
of these analytical perspectives necessarily inculcates an embrace of the democracy of 
objects, an embrace, therefore, of a flattened field of objects and subjects.  
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II. To the Texts: Thoughts on an Object-Oriented Method 
“More then anough we know; but while things yet 
Are in confusion, give us if thou canst, 
Eye-witness of what first or last was done, 
Relation more particular and distinct.” — Milton, Samson Agonistes 
 Developing a vision of an Objected-Oriented literary critique, especially one 
focused on contemporary narrative and texts, poses a variety of major methodological 
quandaries for the critic. The focus on the thing renders many traditional or popular 
critical methods, especially those overly caught up in characterization or semiotic 
questions, counterproductive even as it creates unique critical quagmires around 
questions of determination and interpretation. Crucially, the Object-Oriented critic must 
grapple with questions of scope (perhaps better termed as limitedness), focus, and form in 
developing a coherent method for the analysis of modern texts. This section attempts to 
outline potential solutions to these quandaries while also delineating the larger structure 
of this work’s analysis.  
 Any literary analysis to the objects immediately risks a swift collapse into the 
absurd. If the pervasiveness of material culture, of the thing, is one of the underlying 
motivations for an object-oriented approach, its preponderance risks drowning any 
criticism to the object before it has even begun. An analysis of a page in Gaskell, for 
example, could get pulled in a dozen different directions in a couple sentences, dragging 
one now from a consideration of an “unglazed window” to a scarlet “cloak” and then to 
the contents of a small “grocery” and a “butcher’s shop” (Gaskell 23). An effort to 
encompass all of the objects in an analysis would be doomed to capture none of them. 
While each of these objects play an intriguing and vital role within the ecosystem of 
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Sylvia’s Lovers, the ability of any analysis to capture the activity and alliances of all the 
various things within texts is limited. Thus, any object-oriented literary analysis must be 
a self-consciously limited analysis— just as one within a flattened world, it must delimit 
its analytical alliances while recognizing the power of those things which rest outside of 
its bounds. 
 It is well and good to say that an object-oriented analysis will be a limited 
analysis, but the more important act of delimiting must come in defining how to analyze, 
how to read, to the objects. As discussed above, a metonymic reading of textual objects— 
a consideration of the scarlet cloak denoting at once the British textile industry and the 
widespread nationalism of the Napoleonic era— too easily evacuates the objects in 
question of their vitality, rendering them mere ‘social hieroglyphs.’ A metaphoric reading 
of the objects— an investigation of the scarlet of the cloak in terms of the folkloric uses 
of the color or the implications of menarche— would be equally harmful to the objects 
themselves, almost erasing them from the frame of reference. A more apt analytical 
framework would appear then to be to borrow from the playbook of Science and 
Technology Studies, and specifically from the ideas of Bruno Latour.  
 Latour has argued persuasively for a conception of scientific change and 
development in terms of alliances. As explained in his influential work Science in Action, 
it is alliances between various human and non-human actors which operate to craft 
networks and advance scientific opinion and development (Latour Science in Action 
83-84). These alliances, though, cannot subsume or envelop the entirety of the various 
actors that compose them. Rather, they envision each one acting externally, and in their 
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own interests, so as to craft an alliance of opinion and/or action; Latour famously 
develops an example of fishermen, Japanese scientists, and scallops operating in alliance 
in the St. Breuc Bay in Brittany (202-203). From an object-oriented perspective, this 
vision of alliances is imperative. Its ability to allow one to envision non-human objects as 
actors, without also envisioning them as metonymic vessels, expands the potentiality for 
recognizing their vitality. Suddenly, the scarlet cloak can be seen as acting, in alliance 
with Molly Corney’s opinions, the natural ecosystem of Northern England, and Sylvia’s 
actions themselves, to craft the girlhood of Sylvia Robson, to create a cultural conception 
of both the girl and the lover. An analysis to the objects, then, must also always be an 
analysis to the networks and alliances of objects.  
 While a Latourian network focus allows for an object-focus that does not 
compromise the withdrawn nature of the thing, it also indirectly highlights the 
importance of form in any Object-Oriented analysis. After all, if an Object-Oriented 
analysis is attempting to delineate and analyze networks of object engagement, it must be 
always aware of the meta-textual network developed between the medium of the text— 
the book, the screen, etc…— and the reader. Just as the object within the work impacts its 
networks of alliances, the textual medium actively affects one’s engagement with the 
narrative. While this concept may seem obvious, a matter of general acceptance at least 
since Landow’s publication of Hypertext, the embrace of a flat ontology radicalizes its 
import; the medium is not just the message, but the actor itself. 
 Within those parameters, this project seeks to explicate and demonstrate the 
manner in which a potential object-oriented analysis could occur. As shown above, 
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object-oriented analyses can be used to derive and explore whole new constellations of 
meaning within social texts. This work, though, will limit itself to the consideration of the 
ludic object, the object of play, within the contemporary texts of late capitalist society. In 
contemporary American culture, the ludic object has both a prime placement and a 
pervasiveness that is unparalleled. As play has become the prime mode of behavior in the 
modern space, the material of play has abounded. Basketballs and footballs bounce 
through our advertisements and clutter our closets; the ludic material of video games rest 
like relics within the shrines of modern living rooms. Moreover, this pervasiveness 
extends far into the cultural productions of the current moment. One need only briefly 
scan the works of the most innovative and influential authors of the last quarter-century— 
David Foster Wallace, LeAnn Howe, Junot Diaz, to name a few— to discover a panoply 
of ludic objects. These objects, like the ever-gripped tennis balls of the Enfield Tennis 
Academy, do not only crop up haphazardly within the texts, but rather are centrally 
located within their networks of action and signification. Thus, an object-oriented 
analysis to the ludic object, can escape possible criticisms of the form as being inessential 
or tertiary to greater concerns. The centrality of the ludic makes such arguments ring 
hollow. 
 Moreover, the activity of the ludic object is generally more easily (if implicitly) 
accepted by late capitalist subjects. While most commodities are viewed as lifeless or 
appendage-like (which is to say given life by humanity), the material objects of play are 
given far more credit for activity and influence. This is partly a product of what Huizinga 
terms the “Magic Circle;” in the ritual space set apart for play, the rules of life and the 
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rules of behavior are altered significantly (47-48).  Still, even outside of that space, there 8
is a prevailing societal and linguistic tendency to envision ‘the breaks of the game’ and 
the ‘bounce of the ball’ as vaguely independent operators. The focus on the ludic object, 
then, can hopefully allow skeptical or unclear readers easier access to the concept of a 
flattened ontology and a vital materiality.  
 Finally, the choice to focus this critical survey on objects of play is useful on the 
level of form. In the contemporary world, it is not absurd to broadly characterize textual 
engagement as a ludic activity and the formal network developed between reader and 
medium as a ludic one. The ever-increasing importance of video game texts in the larger 
sphere and the gamification of more ‘literary’ texts in the age of the hyperlink makes the 
act of literary engagement seem to be almost as much a matter of play as of reading 
(Bissell 34-35). Further, even more standard literary novels, like the subject of this 
work’s third chapter, Underworld, mimic this movement towards the ludic, inviting the 
reader to quasi-hypertextually play with the book itself. Thus, a focus on the ludic object 
within the text can provide one easier access into the ludic nature of the textual object, 
operating as a useful and edifying bridge for broader analyses within and beyond the 
present work. 
 The manner in which the Object-Oriented focus on ludic object allows for unique 
insights into the activity of the literary medium works in much the same manner in 
reverse. As Latour says, in focusing on the materiality of the object one should “have no 
 However, an Object-Oriented perspective must alter the traditional sense of this ‘state of exception.’ 8
While for Huizinga, the “magic circle” exception for societal norms of behavior, it must also reflect an 
exception from human norms of recognition. As this project will demonstrate, in the interactions of the 
ludic, the common occlusions of alien phenomenologies are done away with, and the ontological field is 
recognized as more level.
deLacy !24
hesitation in highlighting the text itself as a mediator” (Reassembling the Social 124). 
The various textual forms of contemporary society each impact the manner in which the 
activity of the ludic object can be perceived. In a video game, where the medium itself 
operates as a “magic circle,” the vitality of objects is more readily graspable for the 
player; playing on a computer, one is often more surprised when an object is not an actor 
within the narrative than when it is. Counterintuitively, the medium of the video game is 
perhaps unparalleled in giving one access to the vitality of things and the democracy of 
objects that more traditional narratives and perceptions operate to obscure. The television 
screen, for its part, allows the viewer to better understand the continual withdrawal of the 
object, realizing the phenomenological divide between the real and the sensual qualities 
of the withdrawn in its intercession.  
 These factors provide compelling reasons for the expansion of a traditional 
literary analysis to include the consideration of these more ‘non-traditional’ textual 
mediums. Unfortunately, even now, the critic feels compelled to defend their decision to 
include the video game (and, to a lesser degree, the television show) within the space of 
literary texts. While the value of the video game, and other under-considered forms, as 
text(s) is clear from an Object-Oriented position, its status as literary still remains oddly 
contested in the larger sphere. There remains in our society an instinctive effort to 
separate the basely commercial form of the video game from the aesthetic qualities of 
great literary texts (Bogost IX). The anxiety over the medium manifests itself in a general 
failure of academics to teach on video game texts as texts. There are few colleges 
currently either willing or able to teach courses on games outside of computer science 
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programs.  Thus, it remains necessary to defend the validity and utility of video game 9
research in the literary sphere.  
 To start, it is quite necessary to return to earlier rejections of the rather hoary 
aesthetic insistence on strict limitations as to what counts as a literary text. As Fredric 
Jameson persuasively argues in his essay “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” 
efforts to limit critical analysis to works of high culture misunderstands the value and 
influence of mass cultural texts and defangs the potential power and significance of 
literary studies, while efforts to champion mass cultural productions create a veneer of 
faux-authenticity (123-124). Rather, per Jameson, the reader-as-critic must embrace both 
mass culture and high culture in a “genuinely historical and dialectical approach” (128). 
By reading all manner of texts, a true(r) understanding of the societies that produce them 
may be possible. Such a democratic approach cannot but be appealing from an Object-
Oriented position. In other words, a refusal to limit one’s analysis to the high cultural or 
the mass cultural is to flatten the cultural playing field by rejecting the idea of a 
meaningful aesthetic break between the two cultural modes. In the terms of Levi Bryant, 
this allows for something of a democracy of texts, for something of a flattened corpus.  
 Moreover, though, video games have an inherent literary value beyond merely 
being useful for a “dialectical approach” to criticism. As Ian Bogost persuasively argues, 
video games as texts must be given “respect and attention” by critics both because of 
their mass cultural appeal and their ability to “create abstract representations of precise 
units of human experience” in a way that rivals the productions of more traditional forms 
A quick glance at the Virginia public university system, for example, reveals that there are no courses 9
taught on video games as texts at any of the state’s large universities. 
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(114). In many ways, too, the video game fits naturally into the lenses and structures of 
literary analysis already developed. As Bogost points out, the nature of video games as 
“procedural systems” allows for a pertinent extension of Benjamin’s “unit-operational” 
logic of film (114). The manner in which game engines are borrowed and evolved allows 
one to recognize something of the “anxiety of influence,” if mediated, within video game 
texts (61). Thus, many of the aesthetic signifiers of the literary are evident and inherent in 
the media itself, and a greater understanding of their operations within video games 
would allow for a beneficial expansion and evolution of traditional critical lenses. 
 In the specific case of this work, the utility, indeed the necessity, of critically 
analyzing a video game or a television show is grounded in all of these factors. The forms 
themselves quite clearly impact the ability of the reader to engage and to understand the 
ludic object, and the mediums present unique benefits in recognizing the vitality therein. 
Moreover, the popularity of the forms, both in the general sense and in the specific cases 
of the texts analyzed in the chapters to follow, allows for a more incisive and inclusive 
vision of contemporary society than would a more limited perspective. It is partly for 
these reasons that chapters four and five of this work consider the ludic object within the 
handheld video game The World Ends With You and the television series Friday Night 
Lights.  
 The goal of this work is not, though, to simply explicate an apolitical, 
conservative approach to literary criticism. Although some Object-Oriented philosophers, 
like Bryant, believe that one “should never evoke a political or ethical reason to critique” 
through an Object-Oriented lens, such conservatism ignores the manner in which the 
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ontological positions of the movement cannot but energize particular political 
configurations (“Political Ontology”). As mentioned above, a political Object-Oriented 
Ontology is most commonly seen in ecological terms. However, understanding the ludic 
object in contemporary narratives can present a different means of politically energizing 
the critical lens. As the subsequent chapters of this project reveal, in following that kind 
of object’s activity in contemporary texts one is able to grasp a new sense of the modern 
“material unconscious,” one in which Jameson’s “Utopian strands” of community are 
manifested in the figure of the ball (“Reification and Utopia” 145).  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III. Community and the Baseball in Underworld  
“Such Russian stuff, and here was Marvin today looking for a baseball. But he wasn’t 
inclined to make light of his preoccupation. It had its own epic character…” 
 — Don DeLillo, Underworld 
 Don DeLillo’s vision of American society is inextricably intertwined with the 
depiction of and engagement in sports and play. However, little critical thought has been 
spent considering the importance of DeLillo’s discussion of the ludic, and even less on 
his treatment of the ludic object. While countless efforts have attempted to explicate his 
vision of television and radio in White Noise and Cosmopolis— or Americana and Great 
Jones Street— they rarely stop to consider the manner in which DeLillo’s presentation of 
media often serves to return to questions of play and sport.  Similarly, the importance of 10
the ludic in the formation of characters like Murray Jay Siskind, a sportswriter first 
introduced in DeLillo’s pseudonymously published Amazons who returned as a “visiting 
lecturer on living icons” in White Noise, often evaporates in analyses more focused upon 
“contemporary religious rituals” of pop culture (Osteen 4).   11
 This erasure of the ludic in DeLillo is most obvious in critical responses to his 
1997 opus, Underworld. In his opus, DeLillo threads the history of the second half of the 
American century through the stitches of Bobby Thomson’s home run baseball. Although 
the novel sprawls out from this focus on the ball, stretching like the Arizonan desert it 
 Consider for example Peter Boxall’s excellent essay “DeLillo and media culture,” where the manner in 10
which media in Underworld, End Zone, and even Players serves to represent or reflect play gets nary a 
mention (43-52). Consider, as well, the general lack of critical interest in DeLillo’s pseudonymously 
published novel Amazons. 
 Similar arguments to Osteen’s are made in Philipp Löeffler’s "“Longing on a Large Scale Is What Makes 11
History”: The Uses of Baseball and the Problem of Storytelling in Don DeLillo’s Underworld,” Kathryn 
Ludwig’s “Don DeLillo's "Underworld" and the Postsecular in Contemporary Fiction,” and in David 
Yetter’s “Subjectifying the Objective: Underworld as Mutable Narrative.” 
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details to encompass bombing raids and Eisenstein films, the object never seems too far 
from the novel’s center. The focus upon it renders much of the work a kind of baseball 
fiction. As the critic Timothy Morris argues, “baseball fiction…is about an assimilation to 
an American way of life,” and the activity of the ludic object throughout the novel seems 
fits this traditional narrative (Morris 3). The baseball continues to emerge throughout the 
various stages and spaces of DeLillo’s late capitalist America, operating to manifest the 
unconscious anxiety of the postmodern psyche and to craft the imagined community and 
culture to which the various Americans of the text pledge allegiance.  
  The ludic object’s role in the construction of the imagined nation is first made 
clear in the novel’s prologue, “The Triumph of Death,” the majority of which was 
originally published (in a slightly altered state) as the stand-alone story under the name 
“Pafko at the Wall.” The section opens in quasi-mythic form with the invocation not of a 
distant Muse but of a collective second person: “your voice, American” (DeLillo 11).  In 12
typical DeLillo fashion, the text is quick to undercut the epic (and nation-building) 
ambitions of this entrance. The voice, the invisible third person, is revealed to be spoken 
not by an American Odysseus or Brooklyn Aeneas, but by a black, “scrawny tall” kid, 
“Cotter Martin by name” (12). The only heroic attribute he appears to retain is a stubborn 
individuality; in the larger group of turnstile-hopping gamins, themselves a small part of 
an “assembling crowd” in the urban space, Cotter remains strangely isolated, a “he” 
 The use of the second person in the prologue’s introduction foretells the novel’s continued narrative 12
mutability. The novel jumps freely between the object and the subjective, the third and the second-person, 
until, as David Yetter says, the “integrity of each point of view fades into the other” (Yetter 36). The overall 
effect of this general fading, as is evidenced even in the opening invocation, is the establishment of a 
folkloric narrative vision, wherein the objective facts of history are rendered as subjective connections of a 
community, and the voice of the author is rendered the voice of the community. 
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amongst the unformed “they” (11-12). The interplay between the three pronouns in these 
opening lines— the collective, vaguely situated ‘you,’ the formless, “witless” ‘they,’ and 
the “uncatchable,” unstoppable ‘he—’ operate to reveal a fundamental isolation within 
the heart of the crowded urban space (13-14). Cotter, although marked as gamin, 
although marked as part of the urban bustle, remains strangely alienated from the larger 
community around him. 
  Cotter’s alienation within the urban crowd outside of Polo Grounds, his stubborn 
individuality before the reader’s gaze, serves as prototype for the continual fragmentation 
of the individuals who make up DeLillo’s (under)world. Each of them presents that 
distinctly modern symptom that Lukacs finds in the capitalist novel, the “estrangement 
from the outside world” (Lukacs 66). The feeling of alienation pervades Klara Sax who in 
the city feels “humanly invisible,” unable to connect with (ex-)husbands or new friends 
and must retreat into the physical isolation of the desert before (and after) the novel 
begins, (DeLillo 372). The aching “I” of Nick Shay, which cannot but “withhold the 
deepest things from those who are closest,” able only to express them to “a stranger” in 
the faceless realm of “a numbered room,” rests imprisoned within itself (301). In the 
novel, even the psyche of Lenny Bruce, appears alienated from his “fellow citizens,” 
separated by his Jewishness and his sickness and his “postexistentialist bent” (507). 
Indeed, each character, in his or her own way, rests alienated within the fragmented time 
(between the opening in the early 1950s, to 1992, and then back and forth between the 
decades of the American century) and space (it is no surprise that Part 1 of the novel 
opens in motion, with a Lexus driving “through rustling wind”) of the novel (63). The 
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collective— either the hinted-at “you” of the opening lines or some larger community— 
is unattainable, replaced by the first and third-persons of their narratives, by the 
fragmented individual.  
 It is important, then, to understand the manner in which Underworld succeeds 
(however briefly) in integrating both Cotter and the reader into the larger community of 
the crowd. After his successful escape into the Polo Grounds, the novel tracks Cotter’s 
movement the architectural space, the “crossweave of girders and pillars and spilling 
light,” as he attempts to break through to the baseball diamond itself (14). Suddenly, the 
novel tracks him cutting into the grandstand and both Cotter and the reader are made for 
the first time aware of their inhabitance of the ludic space by the “warm-up pitches” that 
“crack into the catcher’s mitt” (14). As if entranced by the baseball’s flight, the reader, the 
collective “you,” loses first Cotter and then themselves “in the crowd,” becoming a part 
of the “thirty-five thousand” whose chatter is beamed out softly in the background of the 
radio feed (14). The liberation, the “noise and joy,” of the embrace of the crowd’s 
community is explicitly allowed by the appearance of the ludic object on the scene (60). 
Only when it appears can the alienation of the many spectators find a common identity 
and a shared language. Where before there were many conversations, now the Polo 
Grounds has only the liturgy of the radio-man intoning “The Giants win the pennant…
The Giants win the pennant” (43).  
 It is imperative to stop and note here that the unification of the crowd by the ludic 
object does not mean the erasure of hierarchies within the crowd. The multitude of the 
crowd, like the ballpark, remains vertically defined. Cotter’s alienation is tied inescapably 
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to his blackness; as a young African-American boy in the fifties, his position within the 
collective is always already debased, his mind always already estranged in a double 
consciousness. His entrance into the multitude of the community does not erase the class 
and gender prejudices he faces; there remains a reason he is sitting in the outfield 
bleachers while Hoover dreams of Bruegel right on top of the action. Rather, the activity 
of the ball creates an alternative network, one in which the mythic American promises of 
fraternity in difference— all men created equal — can be embodied. Despite different 
vantage-points, each member of the crowd is part of the “everybody watch[ing],“ 
connecting, with the ball (42).  
 Many critics have been quick to point out the connection between DeLillo’s 
portrayal of the pennant game between the Giants and Dodgers and the production of a 
larger community, of a shared national identity. Molly Wallace incisively argues that the 
advertising pages, representing “baby food, instant coffee, encyclopedias and cars, waffle 
irons and shampoos and blended whiskeys,” falling out over the baseball diamond 
provide “a sense of belonging to a larger social system” predicated upon the consumption 
of commodities (Wallace 367). The critic Patrick O’Donnell reads the lingering objects of 
the baseball game as producers of a subject that can be integrated into the “system of 
reality” (O’Donnell 116). These are perspicacious readings, and the broad strokes of both 
arguments— that the commodified objects that first appear in the prologue and then echo 
down throughout the rest of the novel operate to develop the community, American, that 
ostensibly produces them— make sense, but they fail to recognize the activity and 
withdrawal or retreat of the objects, and especially the ludic object, themselves.  
deLacy !33
 The power of the baseball whipping around the diamond does not lie, as both 
Wallace and O’Donnell appear to believe, in the significance outside subjects imbue 
within it. Rather, it exists as an independent actor within the field of the novel, operating 
with its own alien phenomenology. The ball — the “five-ounce sphere of cork, rubber, 
yarn, horsehide and serial stitching—” resists the reader’s impulse to pull it into the realm 
of simulation and signification; it is stubbornly material and stubbornly independent 
(DeLillo, Underworld 26).  Within the magic circle of the diamond, moreover, the 13
baseball, like the papers falling from the rafters, is able to display its own activity— it 
“bounce[s]” and “arc[s]” until “everything submits to [its] pebbleskips” (34-35, 27). As 
player and spectator both bend themselves to the motions of the baseball, its position as 
an actor within the network of the ritual space is made explicitly clear. 
 Indeed, the ball’s power is accepted even linguistically within the confines of the 
novel. Its activity reshaped the Polo Grounds into its image, into a “ballpark” (21).  This 14
may seem a semantic and insignificant change— are not the two names used 
interchangeably in common parlance?— but the linguistic shift in the novel is noteworthy 
in that that specific name, rather than “stadium,” or “rust-hulk,” or any of the other 
phrases used in its place, arrives only after the ball does. The idea of the grounds-as-
ballpark appears to follow in the wake of the ball itself. When it is finally corralled, not 
 Here one may be inclined to ask, though, wasn’t it human (or human-created machine) hands that 13
produced the structure of the baseball itself, that entwined the cork and rubber and yarn? And thus isn’t the 
baseball explicitly produced by human subjects? Although this assertion is, on the face of it, true, its 
valence in discussing the activity of the produced object as object is relatively limited. An effort to 
determine the nature of object along the lines of their material producers would quickly lead to the 
disintegration of any object or subject. Moreover, as Levi Bryant better explicates in The Democracy of 
Objects, each object is both irreducible within itself and without itself, so that neither “endo-” nor “exo-
relations" can disintegrate its being (214-215). 
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by a ballplayer or a businessman but by Cotter, it is the ball moving, “pulsing in his 
hand,” rather than the boy (49). In these moments, it is clear that the baseball is not 
determined by the human subjects around it, but that in fact it operates on the same, 
flattened level of activity as they do, an equal partner in the perturbation of the space 
within which it moves. 
 Moreover, the ludic object’s vitality extends out onto the very structure of the 
page, of the text, itself. While DeLillo’s writing style is languid and metaphoric in its 
description of the stadium and of the crowd, full of paragraph-long sentences and endless 
clauses, when the ball appears on the page the writing quickens. In place of long 
paragraphs comes short sentences and pointed clauses, often eliding a verb or a subject: 
“Fastball high and away” or “See the ball. Wait for the ball” (35, 40). The clipped, 
hurried nature of these phrases reflect the vitality of the ball’s activity itself. The manner 
in which the object is placed as subject within the lines, “coming free” from the crowd 
and “dipp[ing] and disappear[ing],” further reinforces the ludic object’s impact on the 
text’s structure (45-46). The uncontrolled, uncontrollable motion of the ball— which has 
forced the submission of both players and spectators— appears to impact the text’s 
structure itself, forcing Underworld to skip and arc in congress with its own actions.  
 The independence of the ludic object within the scene is also preserved in its 
continual withdrawal within itself. Although it is constantly interacting with the various 
other actors of the ritual space of the diamond on the material (or “sensual,” to use 
Harman’s term) level, it remains utterly enclosed from the determination of others 
(Harman, The Quadruple Object 114). This reading of the ball is a sharp departure from 
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the vision of the object found in traditional Thing Theory, where the thing’s 
“intersubjectivity” is generally read as evacuating any possible signs of vitality (Mao 57). 
The baseball’s withdrawal is most clear in its pennant-winning, home-run flight into the 
grandstands. As it jumps from the bat of Thomson, the object disappears from view 
entirely. The crowd, “everybody, everybody,” is left “thinking where’s the ball;” despite 
their best efforts, they are unable to access even the ball’s physical qualities, let alone its 
interior vitality (DeLillo 42). The withdrawal of the ball from view manifests the object’s 
constant retreat within itself, its invisibility mirroring the constant imperceptibility of its 
real qualities. Even when the ball re-appears, its “stitches visibly spinning,” the sense of 
its invisibility and withdrawal lingers (42). When Cotter manages to grasp the ludic 
object, its flight and roll at an end, he seems incapable of interacting with the ball itself. 
Initially, he can feel only “the heat and sweat of the rival [person’s] hand” as he clasps it 
(48). Untranslatable and distant, the baseball here is clearly revealed as more than a mere 
evacuated sign. It is not a determined product of subjectivity, but a closed-off and 
withdrawn object all its own.  
 As such, the ability of the ludic object to operate as connecter between the 
alienated individual of Cotter and the crowd at large cannot be understood along the non-
ludic, non-Object-Oriented lines that traditional critical responses seek to use. The 
baseball operates not beneath or under the influence of Cotter, Russ, or the crowd, but 
rather allies with each of these actors in a cohesive community. Its nature as an actor is 
not dependent upon its ludic nature, but it is clearly the ludic space which allows its 
activity to be most easily seen. As referenced above, the appearance of the ball on the 
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diamond intertwines the perspectives of Cotter, the reader, and the crowd at large, re-
working the initial structure of fragmented alliances— crowd/stadium, Cotter/stadium, 
reader/Cotter— into the unified force of the baseball crowd. The pull of the baseball’s 
activity upon said crowd, its ability to make “everybody, everybody watch,” deepens the 
ties between each part of the multitude, rendering them a unified network. It is due to this 
network that a common language of the announcer’s voice can be incanted. With the 
baseball’s flight, the individual perspective thus becomes fully subsumed within a shared 
identity, lost not in an estranged mind but in a unified community.  
 While the baseball is able to craft a shared identity within the magic circle of the 
field of play, of the Polo Grounds, once it is taken out into greater space of New York 
City— the place that gives rise to the refuse of those advertising pages falling from the 
sky— its unificatory capacity is fragmented by the alienating impulses of late capitalism. 
Although Cotter rejects the pull to render the material object into a commodity— stating 
definitively “I’m not selling it or trading it—” the baseball cannot long escape a collapse 
into an abased, commodified form (56). Taken back to Cotter’s home, the activity of the 
ludic object is rendered in explicit capitalist terms, with Cotter’s father Manx arguing that 
it would be crazy “to let the thing sit here and do nothing and earn nothing” (146). As the 
ball travels through the marketplace, as it is sold by Manx under the shadow of the 
stadium and traded about between collectors and obsessives like Marvin Lundy, it is 
transformed from a unificatory actor into what Nick Shay calls an “object…all about 
losing” (97). Loss, of course, is built into the nature of the ludic; the differentiation of the 
winner and loser is as important for play as the definition of ritual-rules or the delineation 
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of space. Once Underworld leaves the Polo Grounds behind, though, the ludic object of 
loss does not serve to differentiate the victors from the vanquished, the Thomson’s from 
the Branca’s. Rather, the baseball’s activity serves to realize the loss of mass identity and 
community within late capitalist America.  
 The first loss, the first isotopic decay, that the ludic object experiences is in terms 
of its identity. Entered into systems of monetary signification, the material reality of the 
baseball is effaced and the object is rendered a strange shadow, a simulacrum. Within the 
confines of the ballpark, within the ludic space of the baseball diamond, the reality of the 
baseball is never in doubt. It is, after all, the center of attention. Once Manx brings the 
ball to market, though, the object can no longer legitimate itself, can no longer simply be 
“the ball.” The first man Manx attempts to sell it to makes this threat of illegitimacy, of 
simulation, clear: “you can’t prove nothing,” he says, speaking to Manx but arguing at the 
baseball (359). The object’s new-found status as commodity perversely inverts the 
embodied manifestations of the ball’s reality. The smudges upon its horsehide, the 
imperfections which present first-hand its activity and reality, become signs of its 
simulation. The commodification of the ludic object renders it a simulacrum. “The 
[ball’s] all smudged up,” which is to say the ball is real, and thus the market cannot 
recognize it as such (359). Manx himself reifies this sense of simulation by refusing to 
allow the customer “to touch the ball,” hiding it within his pocket and removing the 
possibility of interaction (359). 
 This shift in perception of the baseball does not render the ludic object itself a 
simulacrum. Even as it is perceived as unreal, both text and reader recognize its material 
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reality in its physical consistency and clear lineage. Rather, the ball manifests the manner 
in which late capitalist consumption crafts simulation out of reality in contemporary 
society; while it is here the activity and history of the object, rather than the productive 
labor behind the commodity, which is effaced by the late capitalist market, the net effect 
is the same. As Jameson says, quoting Rimbaud, the postmodern commodity “faut être 
absolument moderne” (Postmodernism 310-311). In other words, it must enter into the 
meaningless, simulated category of the new. As such a commodity, the baseball can be 
consumed, can be bought and sold and bought and sold, but it cannot be “sympathetically 
participat[ed]” with or recognized for its true materiality (317).  
 The ludic object’s commodified shift towards simulation in the novel leads to a 
fundamental loss in its manner of interaction. While it remained a non-commodified 
agent within the ballpark, the ball’s activity could directly impact the space and the actors 
around it; Cotter could grip the ball and hear its thunk in the catcher’s mitt, could 
participate in its construction of a unified network. As a commodified simulacrum, the 
ludic object’s activity can no longer occur in the manner. In place of unificatory 
participation, the baseball creates difference and estrangement. When Charlie Wainwright 
acquires the ball, “bought from a guy who claimed it was the very object Branca had 
hurled,” he places it statically in “a sort of baseball shrine” (DeLillo, Underworld 
528-29). Charlie imagines enlisting the object as a means of connecting with his son, 
forging a community between himself, his child and the ball not unlike the multitude 
developed in the ballpark. The commodified nature of the ball, though, denies that 
possibility; Charlie cannot “truly believe[] the ball [is] authentic,” and his doubts seep 
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through the network from the “real or fake” ball to the possibility that his son may abuse 
his trust (531,535). When he jams the baseball “into the pocket of his topcoat,” when he 
occludes it again from view and interaction, it is clear that the commodified object is 
serving not to unite the father and son, but to estrange them (535). That the ball is to 
Chuckie even more of a simulation, something “vague and unstable” to be “accidentally 
dumped with the household trash,” can come as no surprise (611-612). His interaction 
with the ball, like his interaction with the other member of the network, is necessarily 
alienated from the real.  
 This localized network reveals the manner in which the ludic space itself allows 
one to recognize the activity of the (ludic) object. In the magic circle of the baseball 
diamond, the object-oriented principles of activity and withdrawal are relatively easy to 
recognize— the ball’s vitality is recognized in its movement within the ritual space and 
its retreat is evidenced by the inability of the spectator to fully determine it. In Charlie’s 
“baseball shrine,” though, its position as an actor is far more occluded. Still, though, the 
vital matter of the baseball is undeniable in the manner in which it intercedes between the 
father and the son. The baseball is not a mere vessel for the father’s doubts about the son, 
but instead produces them through its own “smudged” nature. Chuckie’s memory of his 
father is thoroughly intertwined with his memory of the ball: “he [can’t] think of…the 
one” without thinking of the other (611). Tellingly, he thinks of his father and then the 
ball; neither is solely sign-vessel or signified, but rather both are actors mediating the 
same network of estrangement. Thus, although it is less evident than within the ballpark, 
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the baseball’s vitality remains clear in its participation within and production of new 
networks.  
 Staring at the baseball in his possession, Marvin Lundy says, “there’s an ESP of 
baseball, an underground… consciousness” (179). Having obsessively tracked the ball 
down trough the decades since the game at Polo Grounds, Marvin, and the reader, must 
acknowledge the ludic object’s vitality. Moreover, though, both must recognize its 
manifestation of the material unconscious of its society. By tracing the ludic object’s 
“underground consciousness,” by tracing its interactions and manifestations across the 
decade of the novel, one can begin, then, to understand the twisted nature of the 
postmodern American psyche. 
 In Underworld, postmodern existence, and the mass-market capitalism that 
undergirds and produces it, is typified by decay. As the critic Paul Gleason argues, 
DeLillo envisions late capitalist American society as “a culture whose phenomenology is 
rooted in waste” (Gleason 133). The novel is full of spaces and objects of decay, from the 
tankers of trash trawling the Atlantic to a former Soviet nuclear site on the Kazakh 
steppe, but it is the ludic object “all about losing” which serves to carry the cultural decay 
and waste of the American psyche across the American century. Rather than being merely 
signifier of decay, though, the ball actively interacts with the systems of waste that 
Underworld highlights. The novel’s occupation with the destructive, wasteful nature of 
American consumption— tracked from Nick’s Lexus to the vast waste-lands of the trash 
depots— is actively embodied by the ludic object’s degradation into a commodified 
simulation.   
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 The baseball’s legacy of loss, its status as an object “all about losing,” also 
mirrors the larger forces of personal and political alienation the novel tracks through the 
years, standing (or rolling) as an embodiment of the dissolution of Nick Shay’s marriage 
and the estranged wanderings of Klara Sax. The object’s drift into perceived simulation, 
its de-realization in its materiality in the fact of the market, reveals and reinforces the 
novel’s (and DeLillo’s) fascination with the centrality of the simulacra to the postmodern 
condition.  As Freedgood envisions the furniture of Jane Eyre as statically reflective of 15
the Victorian’s eras unconscious anxiety over and need for the products of slavery, the 
ludic object within Underworld actively envisions and embodies the alienation and 
simulation that rest at the core of the postmodern American psyche. 
 The material estrangement of the ludic object in the late capitalist market-space is 
not the only material unconscious potentiality the novel develops, though. As Jameson 
argues in “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” the utopian seed is ever built (if also 
ever occluded) within the cultural productions of a late capitalist system, and the realist 
space of Underworld is no exception to the rule. As the critic Robert McMinn argues, the 
novel is pervaded by “an irresistible impulse to connect,” both for its characters and its 
readers (37).  This impulse to connection, and therefore to community, serves as the 16
 The baseball’s rhetorical slide from “the ball” to “the ball claimed to be” is matched in many ways by the 15
rhetorical drift of Klara’s name through the decades, from Sachs to Bronzini then back to Sax, “with an x, if 
only publicly” (483). DeLillo’s exploration of post-modern simulation is even more acute in some of his 
later novels, perhaps reaching its apogee in Falling Man. There, the great crisis of 21st century America is 
refracted through the titular character’s guerrilla simulations, and the danger of the terrorist mastermind is 
re-directed through the identity of “Bill Lawton.” 
 Within the text, the impulse to connect is evident not only in the aforementioned missed connection of 16
the Wainwrights pere et fils, but is also reflected in the couplings and failed couplings of Nick Shay, Klara 
Sax, and their various partners. Metatextually, McMinn incisively argues that the manner in which “the 
narrative itself consists of connected sections with quasihypertexual anchors placed throughout” leads the 
reader to jump between chapters and sections, to become “a slave to connection” (37). 
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dialectical utopian mirror to the alienation of postmodern life in the text. Indeed, the 
decay and estrangement that pervades the long sections of “Cocksucker Blues” or “Elegy 
for Left Hand Alone” seem to drive the novel’s characters to seek connection ever more 
desperately. And, crucially, the enduring will to community felt within the pages always 
turns back to the ludic object, the primary source and creator of connection within the 
logic of DeLillo’s (under)world. 
 While the baseball’s connecting activity is occluded by its commodified decay, it 
always meta-textually remains a means of hyper textual connection between the spaces 
and times of the novel. Finally, near the novel’s temporal end-point, the home run ball is 
freed from the shackles of the market-place and its manifestation of the unconscious 
desire for community returns. As Nick Shay finally comes into possession of the ludic 
object, both he and it are restored to a community beyond themselves: 
“I had the baseball in my hand. Usually I kept the baseball on the bookshelves…
but now I had it in my hand. You have to know the feel of a baseball, going back a while, 
connecting many things, before you can understand why a man would sit in a chair at 
four in the morning holding such an object, clutching it—how it fits the palm so 
reassuringly, the corked center making it buoyant in the hand, and the rough spots on the 
old ball, the marked skin, how an idle thumb likes to worry the scuffed horsehide 
(131).”   17
The physical network constructed between Nick and the ludic object finally allows the 
ex-con to feel a connection beyond his alienated self. Like Cotter almost a half-century 
before him, Nick’s material connection to the ball allows him to recognize the object’s 
 This moment is echoed in the novel’s epilogue “Das Kapital,” wherein Nick again clutches the baseball, 17
“squeez[ing] it hard,” and feels connected to “nearly a half-century of earth and sweat and chemical 
change,” to a half century of history (809).
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vital activity in a manner that its previous commodification had obscured— he does not 
enshrine or obscure it, but instead clutches and “squeeze[s] the baseball” (133).   
 Just as in the prologue, the passage’s play with pronouns, the rhetorical glide from 
“I” to “you,” and eventually even “we,” operates to reinforce the sense that this is a 
moment of connection (132). Recognized finally in its materiality, the ludic object is no 
longer a simulation, but is in fact a real actor, one which can connect Nick Shay to 
Branca— “from him to me—” and to the larger history of American society “going back 
a while” (132). Although this moment lacks the clear national implication of “your voice, 
American,” the manner in which the ball’s vital activity allows Nick’s mind to flit from 
Arizona to New York and to flit from his own voice to the memory of Russ Hodges’s “old 
radio voice” makes clear the manner in which this too is a national connection (132).  
 In this quiet moment, then, the redemptive nature of the ludic object and the 
material consciousness it manifests are on full display. Affectively, through the baseball, 
Nick becomes “calmer,” becomes “all right” (133). More importantly, though, both actors 
find their connections to their larger historical community. Gone are the alienations and 
estrangements which have (literally and emotionally) jailed Nick, and gone is the 
decaying commodification that plagues the baseball’s existence. Instead, both actors are 
equally able to interact with the other, and with the larger community they conjure, so as 
to discover the sought-after collectivity of the “we.”  
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IV. The World Ends With You and the Ludic Object in “Any-space-whatever”  
“What the hell kind of game is this?” — Neku Sakuraba, The World Ends With You  
  
 Insofar as they provide open and evident access to the vitality of things, video 
games have a special valence from the object-oriented perspective.  After all, the 18
construction of the Huizingian ‘state of exception,’ the ludic magic circle, within the 
medium renders the activity of objects clearly visible (12-13). The vast majority of games 
rely upon active player interaction with the in-game items that populate their game-
worlds; Mario Kart drivers must chase for ‘Item Boxes’ and players of The Legend of 
Zelda must seek out musical instruments and powerful attire. Frequently, it is this 
interaction which drives the enjoyment of the game-play itself. As Nageristani puts it in 
Cyclonopedia, “there is no pleasure more extreme than to be transfixed before a new item 
or to find a new weapon in video games” (xii). While that affective statement may be 
overly broad, the sentiment is easily recognizable to anyone who has picked up a 
controller; objects in video game narratives are potent actors, not mere evacuated 
hieroglyphs.  
 Although the preponderance of visibly vital items in the medium is important 
from an apolitical object-oriented perspective (like the onticological position of Bryant), 
the utility of analyzing video game narratives from a politicized object-oriented position 
can often appear less self-evident. While, for example, the 1s and 0s behind the digital 
soccer-ball in the latest iteration of the FIFA video game franchise may provide a critic 
with an interesting vision of the commodification and gamification of homo economicus 
 It is perhaps for this reason that critics like Ian Bogost appear to have arrived at an Object-Oriented 18
philosophy through their work on and with video games.
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in late capitalist society, the game’s overwhelming disconnect from other social structures 
make it difficult to access conceptions of community within its ludic boundaries.  19
Although the Object-Oriented ‘state of exception’ within the game-world allows one to 
recognize the ball’s activity, the game’s conscious and unconscious remove from world-
building and narrative render it a less interesting political text.   
 Some games, though, have narrative and ludological functions that compel 
analysis along politicized Object-Oriented lines. Amongst these games— the list of which 
must include games as diverse as Chrono Trigger, Scribblenauts, and World of Warcraft
— one in particular stands out as a useful case study of the activity of the ludic object 
within a contemporary narrative: The World Ends With You.  The game’s innovative 20
setting and gameplay force the player to consider the activity of the ludic object from 
new angles, presenting a vision of the object that is often concealed in the outside world. 
This chapter seeks to trace the activity of the central ludic object of The World, the ‘pin,’ 
within its urban setting in an effort to better understand the manner in which the game’s 
manifestation of late capitalist society negotiates community and space. 
 The acclaimed Japanese video game developer Square Enix released The World 
Ends With You in 2007 for the Nintendo DS console.  Like the majority of the games 21
To expand upon the sense of societal disconnect in the FIFA franchise: although players may ostensibly 19
choose where to play— in Madrid, in London, etc…— there is no sense that any of the games are actually 
occurring within these urban spaces. The stadiums appear to exist in a universe all their own.
 In fact, Scirbblenauts has been much discussed along Object-Oriented lines, as Bogost analyzes it 20
thoroughly in Alien Phenomenologies (40-45). 
 The DS console was Nintendo’s follow-up to its string of wildly successful Game Boy handheld 21
consoles, which allowed players to take video games like Tetris, Super Mario Bros., or Pokémon on the 
move. The DS was (and is) notable for its use of a dual screen (hence the D.S. nomenclature) set-up that 
including a touch-screen for gameplay.
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produced by the developer, it is designed as a role-playing game (RPG), a game which 
asks its players to embody characters in a fictional universe of the game’s creation. As in 
Square Enix’s popular Final Fantasy series of RPGs, game-play is structured around the 
exploration of the game-world and the fighting of non-player character (NPC) opponents. 
These activities lead one to both develop the embodied player-character and progress the 
game’s narrative. Like most RPGs, The World’s basic units of progress (its narrative 
development) is traced in terms of statistical growth; the game’s menu can be accessed to 
reveal a variety of progress bars and statistics that depict the player-character’s growth 
over the course of play. Those with experience with the genre (or with its table-top 
ancestor Dungeons & Dragons) could easily look at the bare-bones description of the 
game’s ludological nature and recognize a fairly rote addition to the RPG library.  
 This work’s interest in The World, though, derives not from its standard plot, but 
from two key innovations it makes to the formula of the traditional RPG. The first of 
these innovations is in the game’s setting. While the most traditional RPG setting is the 
magic-and-monsters high fantasy of a Dragon Quest or Skyrim and the currently most 
popular variant of the genre takes place in the space operatic setting of a Mass Effect or 
Knights of the Old Republic, The World sets out to depict the urban world of the Shibuya 
neighborhood of Tokyo, and to do so as realistically as is possible in the genre. This 
unique setting influences all of the game’s design choices. The player character— who 
one may expect to be a space pirate or high priestess— is in fact a teenage Shibuyan 
sporting the (relatively) normal name of Neku Sakuraba. Potential NPC allies and 
enemies for the character are similarly drawn from a cosmopolitan vision of the modern-
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day: a skateboarding punk, a young woman attached permanently to her cellphone, a nerd 
in skinny jeans. These depictions make clear that the game wants the player to imagine 
herself inhabiting the real city, further muddying the “half-real” divide of the video game 
form itself (Juul).  
 The effort to capture the real world of the contemporary urban space is further 
evident in the game’s graphics. The World’s design aesthetic, ripped from the pages of 
Japanese and American comic books and kept in a semi-two-dimensional graphical state 
in-game, is a thinly veiled attempt to mimic at an urban art-form. Its static backdrops 
feature large and eye-catching skyscrapers, most of which exist solely as simulacra in the 
game-world. On the other hand, the player can stop into buildings like the “The Burger 
Shop,” a multinational fast-food establishment clearly aping McDonald’s, if they are 
feeling hungry (The World). Those few backdrops which eschew skyscrapers, like those 
in the game-area called The Underpass, prominently feature graffiti, cementing 
(assuredly in the game designers’ minds at least) the game’s urban and modern nature. 
However, even while realizing this effort at simulation, these design choices operate to 
obscure the idiosyncratic facets of Shibuya. The skyscrapers appear generic, as does the 
graffiti. The general aesthetic makes the player feel at many points that she could be 
traversing any global city, eating at any McDonald’s or walking beneath any metro 
overpass, and yet, paradoxically,  as if she was virtually inhabiting none of them. The 
game succeeds, then, in simulating not Shibuya but rather a perfect Deleuzian “Any-
space-whatever,” wherein the seemingly familiar late capitalist place— the cityscape— is 
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replicated in fragments so as to be at once strangely recognizable and troublingly alien 
(Abbas 245).  
 Past these elements, though, The World Ends With You also seeks to mirror 
modern urban spaces through the distinct focus placed upon consumption in the game’s 
intricate and all-pervading item collection system. While all RPG video games require 
item collection— the hoarding of weapons, armor, and potions that provides 
Nageristani’s great “pleasure”— The World Ends With You is rather unique in rendering 
its items true modern commodities, objects not only to be bought and sold but to be 
branded. In keeping with its modern aesthetic, the game replaces the traditional 
fantastical armor and magical gear of RPGs with streetwear clothing lines and high-end 
accessories. For example, one of the most expensive and powerful items in the game is a 
chic black handbag. The vast majority of these items, and every one of them which is 
desirable from a gameplay standpoint, must be bought from in-game stores defined by 
their specific fashion labels.  
 Each item is branded by the fictional, presumably transnational corporation which 
has sold it to the player. These brands range from basic stand-ins for teenage sub-cultures
— the goth brand, the skater brand, the jock brand— to high-end luxury lines that make 
oblique references to Armani and Prada. The commodifying and branding impulse 
present within this system extends even to the game’s soundtrack, which can be changed 
based on the player’s purchase of CD’s from the Virgin Megastore stand-ins that are 
present in the overworld. In enacting the familiar real-world behavior of branded 
consumption within the virtual space, the game succeeds in furthering its effort to 
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simulate an urban, crafting a realism that extends past image to what the game critic 
Alexander Galloway would call “ realism in action” (“Social Realism”). This is a hardly a 
positive, though, as the simulation of postmodern commodity fetishism and consumption 
also recreates the negative, alienating aspects of the practices within the game-world. .   
 As in Underworld, the video game thus reveals a cruel irony in its effort to 
simulate the late capitalist urban space. Within the context of its drive towards 
consumption, the game’s representation of Shibuya is transmuted into a third-order 
representation, a simulation of a simulation. The “Any-space-whatever” of the game-
world and the commodities within it are fragmented and estranged by the very act of their 
representation. In this vision, the world of The World embodies and expands DeBord’s 
proposition that “all that once was directly lived has become mere representation” (thesis 
1). In the modern urban space of estrangement, all that was once represented becomes 
mere fragmented echo.  
 Thus, the setting of The World is rendered as a perfect late capitalist space, where 
the ‘logo’-centrism of the multinational brand and the commodifying impulse of the 
market-place predominate. At first glance, one might anticipate that this innovation in 
setting would lead players to feel more entangled and invested in the game-world. As 
Edward Castronova notes in Exodus to the Virtual World, “the verifications of society” in 
digital game-world should lead players to feel more connected to the virtual space (42). 
Although he is talking specifically of online multiplayer games, his idea seems equally 
suitable for the urban simulation of The World. The creation of the game’s Shibuya as a 
Deleuzian “Any-space-whatever,” though, serves to leave both player and player-
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character more alienated from the setting around them. Just as the commodifying and de-
realzing impulses of the late capitalist market-space in Underworld operate to create a 
sense of estrangement, the simulation of the urban in The World develops a feeling of 
radical alienated, one in which the most common form of interaction is, suitably, combat. 
The constant impulse to consume the branded commodities leads the player-character, 
like the Marcusian one-dimensional man, to be “swallowed up by [his] alienated 
existence” (Marcuse 11). The ludological systems of the game reinforces this feeling. If 
the player wants to seek out connection, the best ways to interact with the game’s other 
characters are by either buying goods in their branded stores or fighting them.   
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 The game’s innovative efforts to produce a contemporaneous urban setting has a 
pointed impact, too, on its second crucial innovation: the ludological and narratological 
focus it places on the ludic object of the “pin.”  The focus on these objects is clear from 22
their presence on-screen at all times (at least during game-play) and their ubiquity within 
the game-world. A pin is both the first item a player interacts with and the first thing a 
player acquires in-game, and pins are found in each of the game’s many stores. 
Interestingly, the pins in the game are graphically represented, as in Fig. 1, as both 
clothing accessories and balls; frequent in-game conversations about them oscillate 
between treating them as status symbols and as ball-like play-things. In the terms of the 
game itself, though, they represent the ludic object ne plus ultra. Interacting with the pin 
is the way the player, and Neku, plays the game.  
 To understand the manner in which The World’s pins function as ludic objects 
both within the narrative of the game and meta-textually, it may be useful to consider the 
text itself as an assemblage of units. As Bogost has demonstrated, envisioning games as 
collections of these unit operations—interlocking units of action and meaning— can 
provide new visions into the ideologies and constructs present within the text (Unit 
Operations 53-54). In the traditional RPG, Square Enix’s seminal Dragon Quest series, 
for example, the game is generally made up of units of grinding. Narrative and player 
development both occur through the matrix of random combat encounters, encounters 
which take on the form of a kind of repetitive erosion. Combat itself replicates this 
 Although modern game studies appears to have thankfully moved away from the tired debate over the 22
merits of analyzing video games ludologically (as in Aarseth’s Genre Trouble) or narratologically (as in 
Murray’s Hamlet on the Holodeck), it may be worthwhile to here explicate that this paper follows Bogost in 
rejecting the apparent divide between the two approaches, preferring to view the game as a text of systems 
in which gameplay and narrative intertwine and produce each other. 
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action, as the player is asked to repetitively press specific inputs so as to slowly erode the 
enemy’s health bar. These units thereby serve to inculcate the importance of work ethic 
and steadiness and uphold traditional values of contemporary society.   
 The World’s focus on pins revolutionizes the unit operations within it. In the 
game, narrative and player development are almost completely dependent upon 
interaction with the ludic object of the pin. Indeed, the pin is so important that one should 
discuss the base unit operation of the game as a unit of connection (an operation, most 
often, of connection with the pin). In-game action— exploring the game’s overworld and 
underworld, engaging in combat, fighting in combat— takes the form of player and 
player-character connection to the pin. In more Latourian terms, then, the base unit of the 
game is the production of networks between Neku and the ludic object, networks which 
reflect the activity of both participants. In understanding the unit operations of the game 
in such terms, the vitality and withdrawal of the pin, like that of the baseball of 
Underworld, can be recognized.   
 The unit operation of connection is immediately apparent in the manner in which 
the player performs the narratively-required task of exploring the game-world. In general, 
the player operates in the game’s overworld, moving Neku across the “Any-space-
whatever” of the city. To progress in the plot and to develop one’s character, however, the 
player must shift from the peaceful overworld to the dangerous, demon-haunted space of 
the setting’s underworld. It is only there that enemy non-player characters can be 
encountered for combat. Although at times the game’s narrative attempts to situate this 
shift as deriving from the actions of written NPCs, the ludological action of the maneuver 
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places it firmly at the (metaphorical) feet of the pin. To move from the one space to the 
other, the player must mechanistically connect with the pin on the touch-screen. The 
glowing of the pin in the bottom right-hand corner, as seen in Fig. 2, makes clear at once 
that Neku has interacted with the ludic object, and that it is the latter who serves as the 
primary actor in the shift to the underworld. Thus, exploration in the game can be seen to 
be at base an operation of connection and interaction with the pin, one in which Neku, the 
player and the pin enter into a clearly defined network where the pin takes the role of the 
central actor.  
 In-game exploration, though, is only useful in-game insofar as it goes hand-in-
hand with the other vital action: engaging in combat. Where in traditional RPGs, combat 
encounters are generally random, gaining events, in The World they are based upon 
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actions of connection. One must press one of the on-screen pins to reveal a variety of 
free-floating enemy units, which must then be pushed towards the gravity of the pin so as 
to begin combat. The primary action of the traditional encounter overworld— player/
protagonist finds and fights enemies— can thus be rewritten in The World as a Latourian 
network: the player/protagonist interacts with the pin which in turn interacts with the 
enemies so as to create combat encounters. Moreover, just as in the exploration of the 
game’s underworld, this unit of connection reveals the activity of the pin itself. The 
central role of the pin in the network of the non-random combat encounters reveals that it 
is the ludic object, rather than the human protagonist Neku, who violently interacts with 
the enemies of the game-world. 
 The same unit of connection is evident in the game’s combat mode, and operates 
to much the same effect. The ludic nature of the pins is most evident in combat, wherein 
they serve as stand-ins for the traditional weapons of the genre. Unlike those weapons, 
whose utility is straightforwardly tied to a simple button-press or trigger-pull, the pins-as-
weapons refuse a facile “ready-to-handedness.” Rather, the game’s combat reflects the 
pins as both objects and agents within a network of interaction. Their agential vitality is 
most obviously clear in their in-game “psionic” abilities, which allows them to create 
walls of fire, energy bullets, and a variety of other attacks to destroy enemy units (The 
World). These “psionic” abilities are activated by the player through the use of the 
console’s touchscreen, and occur without Neku moving on-screen. Graphically, the game 
underscores the interaction and activity of the pins by shading them as they are used, 
giving them the impression of ball-like motion as they are activated by the player. The 
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gameplay of fighting is thus totally dependent on the player and player-character 
connecting to the pin, both narratively and mechanistically.  
 Understanding the game as an assemblage of units of connection and interaction
— whereby both The World’s action and meaning are dependent upon the ludological and 
narratological impulse to connect— can thus allow one to recognize the vitality of the 
ludic object within the game. Moreover, it can allow one to recognize the manner in 
which said object, operates at its base to manifest an impulse towards connectivity. 
Taking part in these unit operations leads Neku to connect with human NPC allies in the 
game, many of whom are themselves quite preoccupied with pins (one even goes by the 
alias of Doctor Pin!) (The World). These narrative friendships are themselves units of 
connection, but they are also networks centered on and contingent upon the activity of the 
ludic object. It is fitting that in The World’s end-game mode, many of these allies can be 
found partaking in recreational games built around pins like “Tin Pin Slammer” (The 
World). Thus, through all of these units of connection, the pin acts to manifest the larger 
impulse towards community felt by the alienated characters of the game-world.  
 However, this understanding of the ludic object in The World is constantly 
troubled by the pins’ entanglement with the “Any-space-whatever” of the game’s late 
capitalist setting. Unlike DeLillo’s baseball, which is allowed to exist at least at first as a 
purely ludic object within the Polo Grounds, the urban space of The World ensures that 
the pins are always-already perverted by the commodifying nature of the market-space in 
which they live. Indeed, within the game-world the ludic objects operate as the prime 
examples of the marketplace, and serve as manifestations of the unconscious impulse 
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towards commodifying consumption. Chief among the branded objects for sale in the 
game’s various stores are the pins.  For most players, the majority of in-store purchases 23
will be for different branded pins. And what’s more, the branding of the pins creates its 
own unit of connection— each area of the game has different brands that are “in style” 
and/or “out of style” within them, and the fashionability of a pin’s brand has a 
proportional effect on the power and effectiveness of its abilities. Connecting with 
properly branded pins in the right areas of the game provides significant combat bonuses, 
while using undesirable pins will result in diminished returns. The game’s central focus 
upon the ludic object of the pin thus takes on dangerous overtones. When Neku interacts 
with the branded pins in combat, he is connecting as much to the dictates of the alienating 
marketplace as he is to any imagined community.  
 The ever-present commodification of the pin by the late capitalist space of the 
game operates in turn to pervert the units of connection that make up its gameplay into 
dark and dangerous activities. For one, the pin’s activity and interaction with the game-
world creates and sustains the demons that haunt The World’s cityscape. The 
commodified pin’s central role in allowing exploration must as equally be seen as its 
creation of the enemy characters. Sans pin, the quiet overworld would remain a peaceful 
space and the underworld would remain non-existent. By having the ludic object act as 
the center of the network between the overworld and underworld, the game makes it so 
that the ludic object is in fact the creator of the demons that haunt the city. That it is the 
pin which serves to attract the enemies in the game’s underworld— pulling them towards 
 In proper late capitalist fashion, the branded pins come in all styles, ensuring that all identity 23
groups can be equally induced to consume. 
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it so as to create combat encounters— reinforces the twisted sense in which the ludic 
object acts as a progenitor of the game’s urban violence and the characters’ estrangement.  
 Of course, the ludic object of the pin, while vital, is not a force of violence and 
evil in and of itself. Such a quasi-Situationist reading of the ludic object’s activity would 
necessarily undercut both the evident independence of the pins as actors. Rather, one 
must view its negative role in the narrative and mechanics of The World as a result of its 
place in a network of commodification in the game’s self-consciously late capitalist 
space. During the game, there are no possible networks outside of Shibuya, outside of the 
“Any-space-whatever,” in which the reverse can be imagined. The only option the player 
has to combat the problems of alienation, to seek out community, is through the purchase 
and usage of other pins, other commodities. The market-space of The World thus models 
the marketplace of the world, filled even with the ‘infinite’ profit machine of late 
capitalism.  
 This is a grim picture, but the ludic object of the pin does at times provide a small 
glimmer of escape, and of community. While the activity of the pins is fairly evenly 
evident throughout the game, the withdrawal of the ludic object is clear mainly in the 
combat phases. As mentioned above, combat occurs in the game largely through player 
and player-character’s interactions with various pins, so that it is the pins which serve as 
the central actor in the network of fighting. At times during combat, though, different 
pins will “cool-down,” will stop working for a certain amount of time (The World). 
Mechanistically, this serves as an increased challenge for the player. More importantly, 
these moments of brokenness, operate to bring the player face-to-face with the 
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withdrawal of the object even while it is present— the pin remains on the screen, but it is 
occluded and unmoving.  
 In these moments, the object is an almost perfect example of Harman’s reading of 
Heidegger’s broken tool. In the contest of the late capitalist space of the game, though, 
the forced recognition of the alien and of the unknowable serves a powerful imaginative 
function beyond that imagined by the theorist. In these moments of phenomenological 
de-centering, one recognizes the possibility of broken-ness itself, and the pull of an 
alterity grounded not in consumption, but in play. The glimmer of hope, then, is found in 
the embrace of the ludic object’s continual withdrawal, in the embrace of the radical 
sense of a democracy of objects.  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V. Enmeshment, Ecology, and the Ludic Object in Friday Night Lights 
“And then also, again, still, what are those boundaries, if they’re not baselines, that 
contain and direct its infinite expansion inward, that make [the game]… beautiful and 
infinitely dense?” — David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest 
 Partly due to its relative youth and partly due to its status on the fringes of the 
American monoculture, cultural critics have only lightly considered Friday Night Lights. 
While on the air from 2007-2011, the show was the prototypical much-talked about, 
little-watched American drama, and its lack of monocultural impact has likely hindered 
critical interest.  In part, this is due to a general critical aversion to the market-sullied 24
texts of the television medium. Although recent years have seen an uptick in interest in 
the format, especially for those work like David Simon’s The Wire which benefit from the 
prestige-granting seal of the pay cable domain, Friday Night Lights has been largely 
doomed to critical silence. The only critical volume published on the series, A Friday 
Night Lights Companion, is a cloying recapitulation of online reviews and personal 
essays.  
 Just as Bogost agitates for increased attention to under or ill-considered shows 
like Ace of Cakes or Good Eats as tools for greater access to alien phenomenologies, this 
chapter argues that Friday Night Lights represents a prime and vital example of 
contemporary society’s material unconscious (Bogost 115-119). There have been few 
texts, let alone television shows, produced in recent memory that have allowed for a 
better vision of the vitality of the object than Peter Berg’s drama. Its focus on the ludic 
space of the football field and the negotiated ecological space of the West Texas plains 
The show so struggled with viewership that its final two seasons were aired in an experimental joint-24
format between NBC-Universal and DirecTV so as to allow it to stay financially afloat. 
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actively forces the viewer to recognize and grapple with the activity of non-human actors 
in a way few narratives do. At every turn, the construction of the show’s small town of 
Dillon is revealed to be heavily dependent on the entanglement and activity of objects as 
large as the ecosystem and as small as the football.  
 For the purpose of the present analysis, the show’s grounding within the 
environment of high-stakes high school football renders it doubly important. The entire 
structure of the show is built around the activity of the ludic object— nary an episode 
concludes without the intercession of a football, and nary a character appears who is not 
directly implicated within larger networks built around the sport and the object. As in 
Underworld, the ludic object in Friday Night Lights serves to manifest the utopian 
unconscious desire for community in the society within which it operates. Moreover, the 
ludic object acts to extend this desire onto the physical landscape around the town, 
revealing an ecological bent within the show’s unconscious desire for community. 
 Like Underworld and The World Ends With You, Friday Night Lights depicts a 
recognizable and realist vision of a late capitalist space. However, the show’s setting is 
distinguished by its focus on an image of modern American society in the rural rather 
than the urban or X-urban context. The show’s introductory title sequence, appropriately 
scored by Austin-based band Explosions in the Sky, immediately reveals the show’s focus 
on late capitalist space. While many of the sequences focus on intimate images, of marital 
connection between Kyle Chandler’s Eric Taylor and Connie Britton’s Tami Taylor for 
example, the montage interjects these warm images with a variety of more troubling 
landscape shots. These shots, of electric towers over West Texas plains, beat-up one-story 
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ramblers, and closed fast-food restaurants in vacant parking lots, serve in part to establish 
the viewer’s geographic and socio-economic location—Dillon, Texas well after the oil 
crash— and to convey a sense of realism unto the melodramatic proceedings of the 
serial.  The slight shake of the hand-held cameras used by Berg and his crew serve to 25
underscore the feeling of verisimilitude and economic malaise imparted by the images.  
 The introduction immediately reveals that Friday Night Lights, like Underworld 
and The World Ends With You, carries within it a tension between the alienating forces of 
modern society— does any image better capture the sense of estrangement than the 
closed-down fast food joint?— and the “utopian impulses” of the desire for community 
(Jameson, “Reification and Utopia” 143). The interjections of the two categories of 
images, the cuts between the domestic bliss of the household or the unity of the locker-
room and the malaise of the ramblers and, creates an internal sense of opposition between 
them, even while the cascading interlayering of the theme song attempts to tie them 
together. 
 As the intro smuggles in this tension, it also provides the viewer with the 
narrative’s recurring solution to it. As the montage fades to a close— as the guitars hush, 
the series’s name appears, and the “Executive Producer” tags arrive on screen— it lingers 
on one final image: the titular lights of the football field stark against a cloudy yet 
benevolent sky. The construction of the landscape seemingly presents the dual focuses of 
the image, the man-made ludic space and the cumulus manifestation of the environment, 
 While Dillon is a fictional locale, it is clearly based upon Odessa, the town at the center of Buzz 25
Bissinger’s non-fiction book Friday Night Lights: A Town, A Team, and a Dream. The show itself was shot 
on location in Austin, with the city suburbs standing in for the expanse of the town (“Clear Eyes, Full 
Hearts, Couldn’t Lose”). 
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as harmonized and mutually constitutive. The equipoise of the shot— stadium and sky 
entangled within each other— holds out the possibility for a similar harmonious 
connection between the disparate elements of the montage that preceded it; in the 
entanglement of the two spaces, the quasi-dialectic between the private and warm and the 
public and modern of the earlier shots is strangely synthesized. The fact that it is the ludic 
space’s connection to the environment that provides this resolution is telling. Just as in 
The World and Underworld, the ludic here appears to carry within it a distinct Utopian 
impulse.  
 If this seems a far-fetched conclusion to reach based upon the single still of the 
introductory title sequence, it becomes a more sensible position to take as it recurs within 
the show’s narrative. While Friday Night Lights is not a procedural show along the lines 
of a Law & Order, its structure (built around the quasi-episodic, weekly Texas high 
school football season) generally follows a certain formula.  While the overarching 26
melodramatic plot-lines of the show weave in and out of each 40-minute installment, the 
viewer can generally expect an internally cohesive episodic narrative built on tensions 
developing within either the macro-community of Dillon or the micro-communities of the 
characters’ various families which are then emotionally resolved in either the ‘magic 
circle’ of the football field or its double, the natural fields of the West Texas plains. While 
these resolutions are always necessarily temporary, a fact acknowledged both by the 
viewer aware of the episode to come and the characters aware of the games still to play, 
 There are, but of course, a number of exceptions to this rule— one need only think of the handful of 26
episodes that take place during the football team’s bye-weeks to see alternative episodic structures. Still, the 
formula holds true for the majority of episodes. 
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they continuously mirror the harmonizing operation of the intro’s closing shot. As in the 
prologue of Underworld, the movement to the ludic space of the stadium invariably 
serves to bring the various individuals of the narrative together in the form of a crowd— 
a fact that the show underscores through frequent cross-cuts between the game unfolding 
and various enraptured characters. It further reinforces this sense of community through 
the use of the voice of a generalized radio-man as voice-over in place of the noise of the 
crowd. 
 The show’s recurrent movement towards resolution on the football field, though, 
appears just as predicated upon the space’s ecological nature as its ludic one. Although 
the football field (and the stadium which encircles it) is marked off from the natural 
plains around it, demarcated by its white lines as the “hallowed… play-ground” of 
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civilization’s demesne, once the game begins the dichotomy between its current status as 
a man-made ritual space and its prehistory as boundless grassland become blurred 
(Huizinga 10).  As can be seen in Fig. 3, the limits of the television screen (and the 27
hand-held cameras being used) mean that the viewer rarely gets a full encapsulation of 
the ludic field. Rather, it appears to mirror the expanse of the night sky, stretching beyond 
the edges of the screen. Ironically, through the activity of the game, the ludic nature of 
the field thus appears to dissolve into the larger sense of its natural location. The two 
separate natures of the space are thus revealed to be utterly interobjective, so entangled 
within one another as to be almost mirrors of the larger entanglement of the crowd.    
 How, though, is one to interpret this strange, entangled phenomenon smuggled 
within the structure of the narrative of Friday Night Lights? The community produced 
(with)in the ludic is merely temporary, sure to be erased by the next episode or the one 
after that. Furthermore, even in the momentary connections of the ludic space, it is clear 
that the late capitalist forces that originate the alienation and fragmentation of the 
community are not solved by the routine high school football games being played.  To 28
attempt to explicate the strand of Utopian resolution manifested in the show, it is 
necessary to focus on the vital activity of the ludic object within said space and to draw 
upon Timothy Morton’s conception of the “Mesh.”  
This blurring of the dichotomy is further reinforced by the show’s frequent act of doubling the field with 27
the semi-arid grasslands that surround the town. The manner in which these spaces mirror each other is 
made most evident in the show’s final episode, “Always,” in which Taylor Kitsch’s star football player Tim 
Riggins is seen immersed within the plains landscape in a way reminiscent of his position in the field of 
play. 
 Indeed, neither the show nor its source material shy away from discussing the manner in which even high 28
school football is a space where harmful and alienating hierarchies of race, gender, and class are enacted 
upon both participant and observer. 
deLacy !65
 In Morton’s ecological vision of an object-oriented ontology, the “Mesh” stands 
as a metaphoric encapsulation of the interobjectivity of all things in the world system, 
thereby operating to greatly expand upon Heidegger’s idea of the “contexture of 
equipment” (Hyperobjects 82-85). For Morton, the “Mesh” allows for a figuration of 
causality within the world’s flat ontology; through it, one can develop an understanding 
of “the strange interconnectedness of things, an interconnectedness that does not allow 
for perfect, lossless transmission of information, but is instead full of gaps and 
absences” (83). The gaps between the links of the mesh allow Morton’s Object-Oriented 
worldview to envision causality even while retaining the withdrawn nature, the “strange 
strangeness,” of the individual object (83-84).  As Morton’s treatment of the “Mesh” in 29
The Ecological Thought reflects, the idea is equally useful in allowing one to simply 
understand the entanglement of humans and/or objects in the larger ecological sphere. 
Conceiving of the environment as a manifestation of the “mesh” itself, the human actor 
(or any subject) is forced to recognize his own interobjective connection to it (Morton, 
The Ecological Thought 94). In this recognition, the Utopian desire for community is 
expanded out across the entire democracy of withdrawn objects.  
  In light of the concept of the “Mesh,” the momentary resolutions within the ludic 
space in Friday Night Lights can be better understood as moments of recognition, as well 
as harmony. Consider, for example, the treatment of the ludic object within the episode 
 One may be wondering at this point what differentiates this conception of the “Mesh” from the principle 29
of entanglement discussed in relation to Karen Barad in Chapter 1. The primary difference between the two 
conceptions is the emphasis each puts upon the figure of interaction. To Barad, being occurs in the process 
of intra-action while to Morton, the latter merely rests upon the prior ontological existence (“Treating 
Objects” 64-65). Morton’s position upholds the conception of the uncannily withdrawn object so as to 
preserve the central tenets of Object-Oriented Ontology. 
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“Mud Bowl” from the first season of the show. In that episode, a chemical spill (an 
ecological disaster) in Dillon renders the football field unusable for the scheduled game. 
Working tirelessly, the coach and his team succeed in transforming a pastoral field on the 
outskirts of town into a new ludic space in which they are able to play their playoff game. 
The dramatic tension of the plot rests in the deep resistance that various residents of 
Dillon have to the idea of the pastoral field being a suitable ludic space. Motivated by 
capitalist greed or mere cynicism, they view the two valences as ever-estranged from one 
another, the field a mere “cow pasture for lease” (Friday Night Lights).  
 The anxiety over the boundary between the two spatial valences pervades much of 
the episode, bleeding into subplots about motion and relationships that similarly straddle 
the liminal. As the field is constructed over the course of the episode, the tension of 
liminality slowly dissipates, but it is only truly extinguished when the football appears 
and the game itself can officially begin. In this moment, the true center of the community 
(and the resolving impulse that births it) is revealed to be not the ludic space, but the 
ludic object. The ability of the ball to demarcate the valences of the field— to invest the 
pastoral space with the connectivity of the ludic football field—renders it the prime 
mover in the network of the football crowd. The vision of its activity is thus congruent 
with the vitality of the baseball in Underworld, which similarly defined the space of the 
ballpark through its networked activity.  
 But, crucially, the football’s activity extends past the alliances formed by 
DeLillo’s ludic object. In demarcating the valences of the field, in rendering the ludic 
space from the natural space, the ball paradoxically succeeds in revealing the larger 
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enmeshment of the network in question. Although the ball’s presence allows for the field 
to operate as a ludic space, the actual activity of the object on the field, the play centered 
on its tumbling and fumbling about the “magic circle,” leads the natural state of the field 
to re-emerge— the episode is not called ‘Mud Bowl’ for nothing. As in the intro montage, 
the visual representation of the scene then highlights the overlapping of the (civilizing) 
ludic space and the natural one. Player, ball, and field all take on the same grimy brown 
hue on the screen, blending amongst each other so that it appears that all three objects are 
on the same team.  
 In a sense, the activity of the football unearths the ontological fact that they are. 
Through its dual functions of delineation and unearthing, the object as actor reveals the 
manner in which the two separate valences and the various members of the crowd are all 
already entangled. Through it, one can clearly see the manner in which the ludic space 
and the natural space are mutually constitutive— the one lurks ever within and beside the 
other, appearing to require only the enactment of a connective network to be co-revealed. 
This revelation, in turn, extends out from the mud onto the crowd. Living up to the 
episodic formula outlined above, the creation of the football field in ‘Mud Bowl’ leads 
the town to momentarily connect into the collective of the crowd, allowing the episode to 
close with the happy (if corny) image of the coach fraternally bonding with his old 
quarterback on the field of play.  This resolution, this ephemeral fulfillment of the 30
impulse to community, is necessarily bound up with the ludic object’s network of 
 The dark subplot that mirrors this event— the attempted assault of a high schooler in the town’s empty 30
streets— tragically reinforces and contrasts the sense of community in the ludic space and the alienation of 
the modern boulevard. 
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connection; without the object, there could be no field, without the field, no collectivity. 
Thus, the interobjectivity of the field’s ludic and natural valences is also present within 
the crowd. Their Utopian resolution is constituted by (and constitutes) the mud of the 
field just as much as the cheers of the fans. In other words, the ludic object’s enactment 
of this network makes clear the manner in which the show’s recurrent Utopian resolution 
is an embrace of the “Mesh.” The interconnectedness of things here, as in Morton’s 
formulation, is not perfect—indeed, it is strange and marked by absence— but it is 
present nonetheless.  
 The revelation and embrace of the “Mesh” in this moment fundamentally alters 
the nature of the Utopian impulse in Friday Night Lights. While the activities of the 
football in the show can be seen to be relatively congruent to those of the ludic objects 
studied in previous chapters, the ball’s revelation of enmeshment renders its 
manifestation of the desire for collectivity necessarily inflected through the ecological 
sphere. As the crowd is interobjectively connected to the environmental space in which it 
operates, it cannot collectively resolve itself without the consideration of the 
environment’s activity. The vitality of the object thus gives way to the embrace of the 
multitude of the natural world.  
 This vision of an enmeshed Latourian network also significantly expands one’s 
conception of the activity of the ludic object in contemporary narratives. Whereas this 
project’s tracing of the personal networks of Underworld and the consumptive networks 
of The World revealed the vitality of the ludic along the lines of a social material 
unconscious, the football’s enactment and revelation of the interobjective “Mesh” reflects 
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that the ludic object’s unconscious is as much a negotiation of the ecological as the social. 
Or, put in other terms, that its activity reveals that neither valence, neither sphere, can be 
separated.  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VI. Conclusion: The Politics of the Ludic Object in the Democracy of Objects 
“Queen: What sport shall we devise here in this garden, 
To drive away the heavy thought of care? 
Lady: Madam, we'll play at bowls. 
Queen: 'Twill make me think the world is full of rubs, 
And that my fortune rubs against the bias.” 
— Richard II, Act iii Scene 4   
   
  “The function of play,” according to Huizinga, “can largely be derived from the 
two basic aspects under which we meet it: as a contest for something or a representation 
of something” (13). The function of the play-thing, unfortunately, cannot be so succinctly 
devised. This project has attempted to derive the political function of the ludic object 
through an Object-Oriented analytics. It has explored the congruent actions of various 
objects across three separate mediums to trace out the networks and alliances formed by 
the activity of the ludic object. In Underworld, the home run baseball enacts and 
manifests the Utopian impulses of the alienated inhabitants of the American century, 
allowing for the possibility of the formation of a true community. In The World Ends With 
You, the simulated realism of the “Any-space-whatever” enters the pin into networks of 
commodification and simulation. In the object’s withdrawn alterity, though, both player 
and player-character can glimpse the possibility of a separate structure, one built on 
networks of collectivity, rather than estrangement. In Friday Night Lights, the vitality of 
the football connects the natural space of the West Texas plains to the social community 
of the town, revealing the thorough entanglement of both spheres. In so doing, the ludic 
object also extends the conception of the collective established in the show’s imaginary, 
redirecting the Utopian impulse out towards the natural world. 
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 These objects, like the “strange strangers” of Morton’s “ecological thought,” can 
then be seen to function not as significations but as signifiers, as forces that engender and 
enact the Utopian impulse towards an unbound community (The Ecological Thought 
135). Moreover, the vitality of these objects can be seen to expand the Utopian impulse 
itself. The ludic object’s stubborn withdrawal— the way it disappears in flight in the Polo 
Grounds or refuses operation in the simulated Shibuya, the way it reveals itself to be 
mistranslated— forces a confrontation with an alterity that cannot but de-center one’s 
subjectivity. In the wake of the object’s bounce or spin or bubble, the clutter of the 
everyday cannot but appear teeming and vibrant, compelling recognition and connection. 
In the face of this, the social Utopian impulse must be extended out to include all the 
“strange strangers” of the democracy of objects; the network created between the ball and 
the crowd must be replicated and expanded. In the face of the estrangement of the 
contemporary market-place, the ludic object thus teaches us the lesson of Mao II with a 
twist: “the future belongs to crowds,” yes, but crowds not only of humans but of the 
whole panoply of the democracy of objects (DeLillo 16).  
 And this vision, in turn, freights its own political functionality within it. The 
expansion of the Utopian strand to include the object-world must mean the recognition of 
the latter’s alien phenomenology. As is evinced in The World, acknowledging the alterity 
and the activity of the ludic object is always also recognizing the limits of one’s own 
subjective perspective. It teaches one to recognize that each actor’s perspective on the 
networks within which they operate is necessarily partial and subjective. The strangeness 
of the ball’s vitality, its “pulsing in his hand,” manifests the bewildering sense that one 
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cannot grasp the withdrawn object, but merely mistranslate its fragments. The limits of 
one’s subjectivity, in turn, necessitates the self-chosen alliance, the collective, of the 
fragmentary so as to create the whole. The inherent subjectivity of the individual within 
the democracy of objects then becomes not a problem but a possibility: the untranslatable 
being of each object a promise of an embodied alternative and a future community.  
  For the literary critic, this understanding of the inherent subjectivity may be the 
more important function of the ludic object. If the recognition of objects’ alien 
phenomenology means the recognition of the limits of one’s own subjectivity, for the 
critic it must equally mean the acknowledgement of one’s own fragmentary perspective. 
Take, for example, the limited subjectivity of this project. In following the flight of the 
home run baseball, it has largely neglected questions of gender and sexuality present 
within Klara Sax’s engagement with the materiality of the art world. In unearthing the 
football’s enactment of the Utopian fantasy in Friday Night Lights, it has occluded the 
show’s negotiation of race and class in the landscapes of East Dillon. The invisibility of 
those problematics and perspectives within this analysis does not mean that they do not 
exist, it merely means they operate in networks alien to those of the ludic object, 
networks that the inherent perspective of this project cannot access.  
 The subjectivity of this project, the subjectivity of any critical position, is not a 
bad thing, though. Far from it. It is necessary and inescapable; to ignore the borders of 
the alien would be to return the material object to its undermined, evacuated critical state. 
Rather than being decried, the limits of the critical perspective should be seen as 
energizing and even Utopian. The recognition of the fragmentation of critical perspective 
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is also the recognition of the need for future complementary analyses— of Gaskell’s 
scarlet cloak and Klara Sax’s airplanes and a universe of things— and future critical 
collectivity. If the coming times are to be defined by the alien clamor of the democracy of 
objects, they should be met by a community of critics.  
 Eamonn deLacy  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